

# ANTI-CORRUPTION SAFEGUARDS IN COMMUNES. CONCLUSIONS FROM A SURVEY OF POLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

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**Abstract.** The establishment of effective anti-corruption systems has been demonstrated to be a means of limiting the deleterious economic and social effects of corruption. These systems have also been demonstrated to foster public trust and contribute to increasing management efficiency. A well-designed anti-corruption policy should include not only formal codes of conduct, but above all mechanisms that raise awareness of the risk of illegal behaviour and actively encourage whistleblowing. The ultimate success of anti-corruption efforts is contingent upon the trust employees have in the coherence and credibility of anti-corruption systems, particularly within the context of public administration. The present study explores how the implementation of an anti-corruption security system in local government affects officials' perceptions of the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption procedures. The present study was conducted among local government officials in Poland responsible for anti-corruption safeguards. Participants were randomly selected from a comprehensive list of rural, rural-urban, and urban communes (N=314). The investigation focused on two aspects: the officials' confidence in employees' competence to implement anti-corruption policy and the degree of support provided by superiors in counteracting corruption. The analysis indicates a substantial discrepancy between the existence of formal anti-corruption safeguards and the confidence of officials in their effectiveness. The vast majority of communes (86%) have not introduced an integrated anti-corruption system. It is evident that local governments in Poland are not adequately prepared to address the systemic risk of fraud and corruption. This is a matter of particular concern, given that communes, as the fundamental administrative entities, bear direct responsibility for the provision of numerous services to local residents. These include permits, concessions and infrastructure, such as roads, schools and cultural institutions. In local government units where formal anti-corruption safeguards were implemented, officials expressed greater trust in internal protective procedures and the competence of their colleagues. Furthermore, it was believed that the office was capable of providing adequate support to employees in their efforts to combat corruption. A notable finding was that officials working in larger communes and those with managerial experience exhibited a heightened level of distrust regarding the efficacy of the prevailing mechanisms.

**Keywords:** corruption, anti-corruption, anti-corruption safeguards, anti-corruption policy, public administration, local government.

**JEL Classification:** D73, D78, K42

## 1. Introduction

Corruption is considered to be one of the most significant challenges currently facing contemporary democracies. It has been demonstrated that corruption can have a detrimental effect on public trust, the quality of management and the effectiveness of public spending. At the local level, the existence of corruption can have a particularly strong impact on

the daily lives of citizens, who feel the consequences of corruption-based decisions in areas such as infrastructure investments, public administration and public policies. Corruption has been demonstrated to have deleterious effects on economic efficiency, resulting in suboptimal resource allocation and the perpetuation of social inequalities. Its structural form poses a significant threat, given its capacity to

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penetrate public institutions, thereby destabilising their operations and eroding public confidence in authoritative figures (Wojtasik, 2017).

The intricacies of the phenomenon of corruption are reflected in the diversity of research perspectives and the multidimensionality of the current debates on the subject, although the key studies focus on the influence of corruption on the economy. In addition to approaches that indicate the potentially positive aspects of corruption (Masters & Graycar, 2016), the dominant trend continues to be research emphasising the negative economic consequences of this phenomenon (Haque & Kneller, 2005; Kunieda et al., 2016). The most significant effects of corruption include its destructive impact on income redistribution (Bauhr & Charron, 2020; Sánchez & Goda, 2018), reduced use of foreign aid (Lopez, 2015) and lower effectiveness of economic policy (Baklouti & Boujelbene, 2020; Wojtasik, 2013). Corruption has been demonstrated to increase transaction costs (Banerjee et al., 2022), with this effect being particularly pronounced in areas of activity that are highly dependent on them (Onyema, 2024). The negative consequences of corruption are also evident in the allocation of public resources, leading, for example, to suboptimal choices of investment projects financed with public money (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Spyromitros & Panagiotidis, 2022). In a broader sense, corruption has the capacity to influence the course of action taken by talented and ambitious individuals, encouraging them to seek personal gain at the expense of the public good (Školník, 2023).

Corruption has a negative impact on both the economy and politics. Research has examined the relationship between corruption and various electoral systems (Birch, 2007; Donovan & Karp, 2017), as well as its effect on election outcomes (Tatarczyk & Wojtasik, 2022; Wojtasik, 2024). Furthermore, these analyses indicate the relationship between corruption and the level of political participation (Colomer, 2016; Dahl et al., 2018; Herron et al., 2018). In this particular context, a significant form of corruption is legislative corruption, which can be defined as the potential for corrupt influence on individuals responsible for the formulation of legislation (Meserve et al., 2009).

The issue of corruption in Poland, although long recognised, has gained prominence in recent decades with the re-establishment of democracy and the introduction of a free market economy. The re-establishment of local government and the systemic transformation of the 1990s introduced new opportunities for local communities, but also exposed numerous problems related to the lack of transparency in the functioning of the administration, which was a legacy of the undemocratic reality of

the People's Republic of Poland. Consequently, the introduction of appropriate control mechanisms and anti-corruption systems became imperative. Anti-corruption safeguards in local government units include formalising mechanisms (establishing rules of conduct, developing codes of ethics and good practices, undergoing evaluations and audits) and participatory mechanisms (creating educational programmes to raise awareness of corruption risks and promote whistleblowing) (Marmola & Olszanecka-Marmola, 2021). The effectiveness of these initiatives is contingent on a number of factors, including the determination of local leaders, the involvement of the local community, and support from central institutions and non-governmental organisations. It is imperative that anti-corruption measures are perceived as consistent and credible, as this contributes to the cultivation of citizens' trust in local authorities (Wojtasik & Trembaczowski, 2024).

The present study examines the perspectives of local government officials entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing anti-corruption safeguards within their respective units. This group constitutes a significant object of analysis, primarily due to the distinctive nature of its functions. Local government officials are susceptible to corrupt activities, including venality, bribery related to access to basic public services, the public procurement process, and the issuance of permits and licences (Hussein, 2019; Makowski, 2017). Conversely, this group plays a pivotal role in ensuring the efficient functioning of pivotal areas of public space, whilst concurrently being the object of social observation. This phenomenon exerts a significant influence on the shaping of social attitudes towards corruption and the level of institutional trust.

Over the last decade, Poland has experienced a marked decline in its position in the international corruption perception rankings, underscoring the necessity for a comprehensive examination of this phenomenon. As early as 2015, Transparency International characterised Poland as a country with relatively low levels of corruption, with a score of 63 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, placing it 29th out of 168 countries listed (CPI, 2015). Nevertheless, data from 2024 indicates that corruption is becoming a significant problem in Poland. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has been calculated to be 53 points, placing Poland in 53rd position out of 180 countries worldwide (CPI, 2024). The significance of the problem is indicated by citizens' perceptions, especially in the area of public administration (Cybulska & Pankowski, 2021). This underscores the significance of the research and validates its imperative, as it furnishes knowledge that is indispensable for the conception and execution of efficacious anti-corruption systems.

## 2. Anti-Corruption Systems Description

Anti-corruption systems are a key element in the fight against corruption, providing a formalised mechanism for counteracting it. Their importance is growing, particularly within local government units such as communes. These basic administrative units are directly responsible for providing many services to local residents. To ensure social justice and the efficient management of public resources, they must be transparent and honest in their actions. The counteraction of corruption at the local level is of significant importance in the mechanisms of political accountability. This enables the inhabitants to exercise control over the actions of the authorities and to hold them responsible for the decisions they make. This accountability constitutes one of the foundational principles of local democracy, ensuring transparency of decision-making processes and fostering citizens' trust in their representatives (Wojtasik, 2019).

An anti-corruption system can be defined as a set of mechanisms, procedures and activities that are designed to prevent, detect and respond to instances of corruption. The objective of the aforementioned legislation is to ensure transparency, honesty and accountability in the activities of public institutions, including communes. An effective anti-corruption system must integrate preventive, control and educational measures, thereby contributing to the building of public trust and the effective management of public resources. Anti-corruption systems encompass measures grounded in national laws and local regulations, thereby establishing the legal foundation that delineates the obligations of local authorities with regard to transparency and accountability. The importance of mechanisms that ensure openness and transparency in decision-making processes is paramount. This encompasses the provision of public access to information regarding tenders, budgets, contracts and other administrative decisions. The promotion of integrity is achieved through the establishment of codes of ethics that establish standards of conduct for local government employees and the implementation of whistleblowing systems that enable the anonymous reporting of suspected corruption. Educational measures and information campaigns that raise public awareness and promote integrity are also crucial, as are monitoring and audits that help identify corruption risks and assess the effectiveness of the measures introduced (Larmour & Wolanin, 2013).

Having anti-corruption systems in place at a local government level offers multiple benefits. First and foremost, these systems build public trust, forming the foundation of local democracy. Transparent procedures and control mechanisms ensure that residents can be confident that public funds are being

used for their intended purpose. These systems also increase management efficiency by eliminating losses caused by fraud and corruption. Furthermore, effective anti-corruption measures enhance the reputation of communes as reliable and trustworthy partners when dealing with investors, external organisations and local communities. They also enable potential threats to be identified and addressed at an early stage, thereby minimising the risk of scandals and abuses. Consequently, communes with well-functioning anti-corruption systems are better able to fulfil their duties and serve their inhabitants (Krajewska & Makowski, 2017).

Anti-corruption systems function under different social, economic and political conditions, meaning their effectiveness varies. A well-designed anti-corruption system does more than send a clear message that misconduct is not tolerated, because this alone is not enough. An effective system incorporates rules and procedures, such as the delegation of responsibilities, training and incentives, to ensure that ethical principles are fully integrated into operational activities. It is imperative that this recognition is acknowledged by both management and rank-and-file employees. A culture of tolerance for rule-breaking can emerge when leaders adopt an unethical approach and demonstrate poor faith, resulting in weak empowerment. The perception that misconduct will not be taken seriously is arguably the most significant factor discouraging individuals from opposing unethical practices. The design of an effective anti-corruption system must be based on appropriate procedures (which will be unique to each entity), identified through risk assessment, which must be constantly evaluated and improved. Effective action is not a one-off activity, but rather a constant and evolving practice (Myśliwiec & Turska-Kawa, 2016).

One of the key aspects of counteracting corruption in local government is the level of involvement of local leaders, who often initiate and promote anti-corruption activities. Whether the introduced mechanisms will actually function or remain a formality depends on their determination and openness to transparency. Educating officials and citizens also plays a vital role in ensuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption systems. A community that is cognisant of its surroundings is more likely to monitor the actions of authorities and respond to any malpractice that may be observed. Information campaigns and educational programmes have been shown to increase citizens' knowledge of corruption mechanisms and ways to counteract it, at the same time building their commitment. Another salient factor pertains to the organisational culture of offices. Anti-corruption safeguards work more effectively where a work ethic based on transparency and accountability prevails. Such a culture can be fostered by implementing codes



of ethics and providing regular training for employees. However, resistance to change and a lack of political will can significantly undermine the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures (Fajar & Muriman, 2018). The availability of financial and human resources is also important. Local government units with larger budgets can invest in modern technological tools, such as platforms for monitoring public tenders or whistleblowing systems. Smaller units often struggle with a lack of funds, which limits their capabilities in this area. Co-operation with external partners, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), inspection bodies and law enforcement agencies, can significantly increase the effectiveness of anti-corruption systems. This type of collaboration facilitates knowledge sharing, technical support, and more effective law enforcement (Carr & Outhwaite, 2011).

A lack of anti-corruption systems poses a number of risks that can have a serious impact on the functioning of local communities. Primarily, the absence of transparency and control mechanisms fosters corruption, resulting in the mismanagement of public funds and increased administrative costs. Furthermore, corruption can cause a decline in residents' trust in local authorities, thereby weakening the foundations of democracy and reducing people's involvement in social life. Additionally, the absence of anti-corruption systems can result in the perpetuation of informal arrangements and nepotism, which, in turn, limits equal opportunities and access to public services. Such an environment has the potential to act as a deterrent to both investors and external partners, who may be apprehensive about engaging with an organisation due to concerns regarding dishonesty and instability. The absence of anti-corruption measures has been demonstrated to engender an elevated risk of scandal, which can exert a deleterious effect on both the image of the commune and the quality of life of its inhabitants. Consequently, the establishment of effective anti-corruption systems is imperative for the development of an honest and effective local government.

### 3. Study Design

The objective of the present study was to ascertain the opinions and attitudes of officials responsible for the functioning of anti-corruption safeguards in their respective organisational units. The analysis focused on two key aspects: formal anti-corruption mechanisms and their subjective perception by officials. Formal mechanisms, including procedures, codes of ethics and whistleblowing systems, serve as external controls, establishing the framework for action and constraining the potential for corrupt behaviour. The efficacy of these measures is contingent upon the assumption that explicitly delineated

regulations are in place and are consistently enforced. This assumption fosters a perception of systemic security, irrespective of the degree of trust placed in colleagues or the prevailing institutional environment.

The second area of analysis focused on the mechanisms reflecting officials' personal competence and their attitudes towards corruption. These mechanisms relate to their sense of personal effectiveness and their knowledge and ability to react to potentially corrupt situations. Support mechanisms for officials play a key role here. Thanks to these, officials gain more self-confidence, which translates into greater effectiveness in performing their tasks. The enhancement of these mechanisms has the potential to contribute to the more effective functioning of anti-corruption systems in public administration, both through the improved preparation of officials and through their increased belief in the effectiveness of the safeguards employed. This article poses two research questions: (1) Is there a relationship between the seniority of officials responsible for corruption prevention and their opinions on these measures? (2) Does the size of the commune influence the opinions of officials on the anti-corruption safeguards in place in their communes?

### 4. Participants

The present study was conducted between May 2023 and June 2024 on a random sample of 314 local government officials responsible for anti-corruption safeguards. The communes were selected on an arbitrary basis from a comprehensive list of rural, rural-urban and urban communes. In order to address this issue, contact was made with the individuals responsible for anti-corruption policy, or, in instances where such individuals were not available, with those indicated by the commune authorities. The interviewers, who had undergone extensive training, were tasked with contacting the relevant individuals and scheduling a suitable time for the interview. The interviews were conducted online via MS Teams. The decision was taken not to record the proceedings due to the sensitivity of the issues raised. Furthermore, the anonymity of the officials and the confidentiality of the information they provided was guaranteed.

### 5. Variables

In the survey, attitudes towards anti-corruption safeguards were considered, as expressed in three statements: (1) "I am convinced that the internal procedures in my office help to protect against corruption." (2) "The officials in my office have the appropriate competence to implement the anti-corruption policy." (3) "My office provides adequate support to its employees in the area of anti-corruption

protection." Respondents rated them on a five-point scale, where 1 meant strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree.

The additional variables used in the study were the length of time that the respondents had worked in a managerial position, and the size of the commune. The sample varied in terms of seniority in managerial positions. The largest group declared that they had held such a position for more than ten years (71; 22.6%). Other groups reported having worked in a management position for between five and ten years (37; 11.8%) or up to five years (38; 12.1%). Almost half of the respondents were not in a management position at the time of the interview (168; 53.5%).

The survey participants represented communes of various sizes. The majority of officials were employed within communes with a population of between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants (142; 45.2%), with a slightly lower proportion employed in communes with up to 5,000 residents (120; 38.2%). Larger communes (20,000-100,000 inhabitants) were represented by 43 officials (13.7%), and cities with over 100,000 inhabitants by nine officials (2.9%).

## 6. Results

The vast majority of respondents (270, or 86%) stated that their office did not have an integrated anti-corruption protection system. Fewer than 10% (29) of the offices surveyed had such a system. Some respondents were unsure (15; 4.8%).

The study confirmed significant relationships between the beliefs and claims of officials with regard to anti-corruption safeguards in their communes. The conviction that internal procedures help protect against corruption was found to be positively associated with the perception that officials possess the necessary competencies to implement anti-corruption policy ( $r = .574$ ) and that the office provides adequate support to employees in the field of anti-corruption protection ( $r = .590$ ). Furthermore, the

assessment of the officials' competence to implement the anti-corruption policy correlated with the belief that the office properly supports employees in the context of anti-corruption ( $r = .630$ ).

A negative correlation has been observed between confidence in anti-corruption safeguards and the length of time in office, as well as the size of the commune in which the office is located. This suggests that a shorter period in a management position is associated with a better assessment of internal anti-corruption safeguards ( $r = -.144$ ), a better evaluation of the competence of officials to implement anti-corruption policy ( $r = -.424$ ), and the belief that the office provides employees with adequate support in anti-corruption activities ( $r = -.186$ ). Furthermore, the study found that holding a managerial position in a smaller commune was associated with a better assessment of the anti-corruption policy ( $r = -.153$ ), a positive perception of the competence of officials ( $r = -.279$ ) and institutional support for its implementation ( $r = -.165$ ).

During the study, we examined whether the presence of an anti-corruption system influences the belief in its effectiveness in preventing corruption. The results confirm that implementing such a system significantly changes attitudes towards anti-corruption safeguards. Officials in organisations with an anti-corruption system in place rated all three dimensions – internal procedures, officials' competence in implementing anti-corruption policies, and office support in this regard – significantly more positively.

## 7. Conclusions and Discussion

The objective of the present study was to ascertain the impact of the implementation of an anti-corruption security system on the perception of the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption procedures, as well as on the competence of officials and the support provided by the office in this regard. A randomised survey was conducted among a selection of officials responsible for anti-corruption policy in communes of various

Table 1

**Correlation between analysed variables (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient)**

|                                                                                                        | (1)     | (2)     | (3)     | (4)     | (5) |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----|
| (1) I am convinced that the internal procedures in my office help to protect against corruption        | -       |         |         |         |     |
| (2) The officials in my office have the appropriate competence to implement the anti-corruption policy | .574**  | -       |         |         |     |
| (3) My authority ensures that its employees receive the right support with regard to anti-corruption   | .590**  | .630**  | -       |         |     |
| (4) Seniority in a management position in the office                                                   | -.144*  | -.424** | -.186** | -       |     |
| (5) Size of the commune                                                                                | -.153** | -.279** | -.165** | -.156** | -   |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2

**Mean attitudes towards anti-corruption safeguards presented by respondents from offices with or without an anti-corruption safeguard system**

| Is there an anti-corruption system in place at the office? |      | I am convinced that the internal procedures in my office help to protect against corruption. | The employees in my office have the appropriate competence to implement the anti-corruption policy. | My office ensures that its employees receive the right support with regard to anti-corruption. |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| YES                                                        | Mean | 4.10                                                                                         | 3.41                                                                                                | 4.32                                                                                           |
|                                                            | N    | 29                                                                                           | 29                                                                                                  | 29                                                                                             |
|                                                            | SD   | 1.012                                                                                        | 1.701                                                                                               | .791                                                                                           |
| NO                                                         | Mean | 3.67                                                                                         | 3.16                                                                                                | 3.87                                                                                           |
|                                                            | N    | 270                                                                                          | 270                                                                                                 | 270                                                                                            |
|                                                            | SD   | .978                                                                                         | 1.388                                                                                               | .995                                                                                           |
| I do not know                                              | Mean | 4.13                                                                                         | 4.07                                                                                                | 3.93                                                                                           |
|                                                            | N    | 15                                                                                           | 15                                                                                                  | 15                                                                                             |
|                                                            | SD   | .743                                                                                         | .704                                                                                                | .884                                                                                           |
| Total                                                      | Mean | 3.74                                                                                         | 3.23                                                                                                | 3.91                                                                                           |
|                                                            | N    | 314                                                                                          | 314                                                                                                 | 314                                                                                            |
|                                                            | SD   | .981                                                                                         | 1.406                                                                                               | .978                                                                                           |

sizes (rural, urban-rural and urban). The results of the study demonstrate the complexity of the perception of anti-corruption systems in Polish communes and their actual functioning. A salient finding of the study is the marked incongruity between the existence of formal anti-corruption safeguards and the level of confidence of officials in their effectiveness. The vast majority of respondents (86%) declared the absence of an integrated anti-corruption system in their offices, thereby confirming previous observations regarding the fragmented nature of anti-corruption measures at the local level (Wojtasik, 2018). This situation suggests that, despite the existence of formal regulations, their practical effectiveness may be limited, and the absence of comprehensive solutions diminishes their real significance.

It is also interesting to note that officials employed in communes with a larger population and those with longer seniority in managerial positions are more sceptical about the effectiveness of existing mechanisms. This phenomenon may be attributed to their heightened exposure to procedural challenges and a heightened awareness of the limitations of the implemented anti-corruption policies (Myśliwiec & Turska-Kawa, 2016). In large communes, where administrative processes are more complex, the implementation of uniform mechanisms can be difficult due to the complicated organisational structure and the greater number of stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. In smaller administrative units, however, limited resources can result in anti-corruption safeguards being marginalised or applied only to a minimum extent.

The research also confirms the importance of institutional support and adequate resources for

effective anti-corruption measures. In offices where formal anti-corruption safeguards were in place, officials expressed a higher level of trust in internal protective procedures and the competence of colleagues. This finding suggests that the efficacy of anti-corruption mechanisms is not solely dependent on the existence of regulations, but rather on the manner in which they are implemented and enforced. In the context of extant research, the issue of organisational culture is also important. As Rose-Ackerman & Palifka (2016) observe, the efficacy of anti-corruption systems is contingent not only on the implementation of top-down procedures, but also on the extent to which officials are engaged and the prevailing social norms within a given institution. The findings of this study appear to corroborate this hypothesis, demonstrating that regulations, in isolation, are insufficient to effectively counteract corruption if they are not supplemented by active educational and supervisory support.

Moreover, the analysis demonstrated that while anti-corruption training represents the most prevalent approach to enhancing safeguards, its efficacy is constrained if it is not accompanied by the practical implementation of compliance rules in the day-to-day management of offices. Another salient point pertains to the absence of adequate instruments for the monitoring and reporting of irregularities, a deficiency that also undermines the efficacy of anti-corruption systems. The implementation of mechanisms such as anonymous whistleblowing systems has the potential to enhance the efficacy of preventive measures and to cultivate greater levels of trust in authorities and officials. It is therefore vital to emphasise that a variety of methods of combating corruption should be integrated, combining a procedural approach with

measures to promote a culture of integrity and the accountability of public officials.

Research conducted among local government officials has enabled the formulation of several important conclusions regarding anti-corruption safeguards in Polish communes. Firstly, it has been demonstrated that formal anti-corruption mechanisms are seldom implemented in a comprehensive manner, and their fragmented nature engenders limited confidence in their effectiveness. Secondly, the effectiveness of anti-corruption systems is perceived differently depending on the size of the commune and the professional experience of the officials, indicating the necessity for a more individualised approach to the design of anti-corruption policies. Thirdly, the study confirmed that the effectiveness of anti-corruption systems depends not only on the existence of formal regulations, but also on their consistent enforcement. It was indicated that where procedures are clearly defined and actively applied, the level of trust of officials in anti-corruption activities is higher. Conversely, in communes where safeguards are regarded as a mere formality, these mechanisms tend to become ineffectual. This underscores the imperative for the implementation of novel regulatory frameworks, complemented by systematic monitoring and adaptive modifications, contingent on local requirements and circumstances. Fourthly, the role of organisational culture in the effectiveness of anti-corruption safeguards is significant. Research indicates that civil servants employed in institutions that prioritise transparency and accountability are more inclined to combat corruption and engage in preventive measures. Conversely, in organisations where there is an absence of suitable ethical standards or where

certain irregularities are condoned, anti-corruption safeguards may prove to be ineffectual.

Based on the research results, it is recommended that activities aimed at implementing comprehensive anti-corruption systems in communes are intensified, particularly through strengthening the education of officials, developing control mechanisms, and promoting transparent decision-making processes. It is also advisable to consider developing nationwide anti-corruption safeguards that take into account the specific nature of large and small administrative units. The study also revealed certain methodological limitations. Subsequent analyses should also address comparisons between different offices and the impact of legislative changes on officials' attitudes towards anti-corruption systems. Additionally, there is a necessity to extend the research to encompass the long-term effectiveness of the implemented mechanisms and their impact on reducing the level of corruption in local government units.

### Supplementary Materials

**Publication Ethics:** Informed consent was obtained from all participants included in the study. Ethical approval was obtained by the Ethics Committee of the authors' institution.

**Disclosure of interest:** The authors reported there are no competing interests to declare.

**Data availability:** The data set supporting the results is available here: [https://osf.io/xuc98/?view\\_only=5bf68c75c7eb46cdae4fca5489973bd0](https://osf.io/xuc98/?view_only=5bf68c75c7eb46cdae4fca5489973bd0) (anonymized).

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