

ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PRACTICE OF THE ECHR IN THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF UKRAINE (CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES)

Anastasiia Pidgorodynska¹, Olha Polunina², Oleg Pushkar³

Abstract. Implementing the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) within Ukraine's national judicial system, particularly in criminal and civil proceedings, is a pressing issue in the context of the country's European integration and ongoing legal reforms. Despite Ukraine's formal commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights, systemic deficiencies, including chronic underfunding of enforcement institutions, continue to undermine compliance. This has resulted in mounting financial liabilities, encompassing compensation payments and reputational costs, thereby imposing a substantial strain on the state budget. The relevance of the study lies in the growing economic consequences of Ukraine's non-compliance with ECHR decisions, especially in cases of systemic violations such as *Burmich and Others v. Ukraine*, which exposed institutional failures in executing domestic judgments. The objective of this research is to conduct a comprehensive economic and legal analysis of the implementation of ECHR decisions in Ukraine, with a focus on criminal and civil justice. The objective of the present study is twofold: firstly, to identify the key economic risks and institutional shortcomings affecting compliance, and secondly, to propose reforms to mitigate these risks and shortcomings. The methodology employed is founded upon the principles of the comparative legal method, formal logical analysis, and systemic-structural approach. The examination encompasses national legislation, case law, and international best practices. The results of the study demonstrate that the primary barrier to effective implementation is the lack of dedicated budgetary funding, despite recent efforts by the Ministry of Justice to improve enforcement. The article concludes that it is essential for sustainable reform that legal obligations are aligned with financial planning.

Keywords: criminal proceedings, civil proceedings, budgetary impact, financial liability.

JEL Classification: K14, K15, H61

1. Introduction

Ukraine's commitment to upholding human rights standards under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) necessitates not only legal alignment but also the effective implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) within its domestic judicial system. This obligation assumes particular significance in the context of criminal and civil proceedings, where violations of procedural and substantive rights persist in being identified by the Strasbourg Court. Notwithstanding the implementation of certain legal

and institutional reforms, Ukraine continues to be among the foremost countries in terms of the number of pending judgments and repetitive cases (Council of Europe, 2023a). A considerable proportion of these judgments pertain to structural deficiencies, including the non-enforcement of national court decisions, an absence of fair trial guarantees, and ineffective remedies. These structural deficiencies engender both legal uncertainty and substantial financial obligations for the state.

The economic consequences of Ukraine's non-compliance with ECtHR decisions have attracted

¹ National University "Odesa Law Academy", Ukraine (*corresponding author*)

E-mail: pidgorodynska.a@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6822-2409>

² National University "Odesa Law Academy", Ukraine

E-mail: polunina3494@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7062-3623>

³ State Tax University, Ukraine

E-mail: df05300822@tnu.edu.ua

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-4194-1754>



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mounting attention in both legal scholarship and policy debates. Repeated failures to execute judgments, especially those involving systemic violations, have resulted in the accumulation of financial liabilities, manifesting as just satisfaction payments, interest, and administrative penalties (Venice Commission, 2021). The case of *Burmich and Others v. Ukraine* is particularly illustrative, where more than 12,000 repetitive applications were struck out due to Ukraine's failure to implement the pilot judgment in *Ivanov v. Ukraine* concerning the non-enforcement of final domestic court decisions (PRAVO.UA, 2021). This case exemplifies not only legal but also budgetary inefficiency, as unresolved structural issues result in long-term public spending and reputational costs.

In response, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine has issued new policy instruments, with the aim of improving the coordination of ECtHR judgment enforcement at the national level (HUDOC, 2024). However, legal associations and NGOs emphasise that these efforts are undermined by the persistent lack of state funding and inadequate institutional capacity (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 2023). Absent stable financial support, implementation remains partial, further eroding public trust in the justice system and Ukraine's credibility before the Council of Europe.

The present article explores the intersection of legal compliance and economic burden in the implementation of ECtHR decisions in Ukraine, with a particular focus on criminal and civil cases. The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the economic consequences of non-compliance, whilst evaluating policy responses and proposing actionable reforms.

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The tasks of the study are as follows:

- To analyse the economic consequences of Ukraine's failure to implement, or delayed implementation of, ECtHR judgements, particularly in civil and criminal proceedings, including losses to the state budget, increased compensation payments and the long-term costs of repeated violations.
- To assess the effectiveness of national legal and institutional mechanisms for enforcing ECtHR decisions; to identify systemic obstacles, such as a lack of funding and institutional coordination; and to propose reforms that are both economically and legally justified, with the aim of improving compliance.

2. Methodology

This study uses a multidimensional methodological framework to analyse the economic and legal implications of implementing European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings in Ukraine, focusing specifically on civil and criminal proceedings. The chosen methods include comparative legal analysis, formal logical analysis and systemic-structural analysis, which together ensure a comprehensive and balanced investigation.

The comparative legal method is used to analyse the similarities and differences between Ukrainian legislation and the legal standards set out in the ECHR. This involves analysing Ukraine's Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure in relation to relevant ECHR case law and the jurisprudence of European Union member states. By comparing these legal frameworks, the study highlights gaps in national legislation and institutional practices that hinder effective implementation.

The formal logical analysis is employed to explore the internal consistency and rational structure of both national legal norms and judicial practices related to the execution of ECtHR judgments. This method facilitates the identification of contradictions, ambiguities, and enforcement deficiencies in the application of ECHR standards within Ukrainian courts.

The systemic-structural approach is employed to assess the institutional framework for enforcing ECtHR judgments. The study examines the roles and interrelationships among national courts, the Ministry of Justice, the Verkhovna Rada, and other stakeholders involved in the legal and financial execution of ECtHR rulings. This text focuses on the Order of the Ministry of Justice and the ongoing work of legal reform commissions and parliamentary committees.

This research further includes an analysis of statistical data on the volume and nature of ECHR judgments against Ukraine, national enforcement rates, and the allocation of budgetary resources for compensation and compliance measures. Case studies, for example *Burmich and Others v. Ukraine*, are employed to provide contextual and practical illustrations of systemic issues.

Finally, the study incorporates international best practices by analysing successful models of ECHR implementation in selected EU countries. These comparative insights are used to generate evidence-based recommendations for improving both the legal and economic mechanisms supporting the enforcement of human rights judgments in Ukraine.

3. Recent Research Studies

The academic discourse surrounding the implementation of European Court of Human

Rights (ECHR) judgments in Ukraine has evolved substantially, particularly given Ukraine's pro-European stance and the ongoing conflict with Russia. The intersection of law, economics and institutional capacity has emerged as a key theme in recent publications. A plethora of studies have examined the challenges and implications of aligning Ukraine's legal system with the standards of the ECHR, with a particular focus on the procedural and economic dimensions of this process. These analyses provide critical insights into the obstacles faced by Ukraine in enforcing ECHR decisions, especially in the criminal and civil justice domains.

In their seminal 2021 study, Komarov and Tsvina conducted a foundational exploration of the influence of ECHR jurisprudence on Ukrainian civil procedure. It is evident that the procedural rights enshrined in the Convention have catalysed amendments to national legislation. However, the effectiveness of implementation remains hindered by systemic deficiencies, including delays in enforcement and inadequate legal training. Their research confirms that alignment with the ECHR standards cannot be achieved through legislative reform alone; it must also involve institutional restructuring and consistent funding.

In a similar vein, Izarova, Uhrynovska, and Hartman (2024) have examined compensation mechanisms in civil litigation through the lens of ECHR standards. It is asserted that, despite Ukraine's adoption of legislative measures intended to align with the rulings of the ECtHR, numerous victims of rights violations continue to encounter substantial challenges in accessing compensation. These challenges are compounded by the underfunding of the judiciary and enforcement institutions, contributing to a pervasive crisis of trust in the legal system.

Furthermore, Nate (2024) builds on this discussion by positioning the implementation of ECtHR judgments as a key component of Ukraine's post-war recovery and European integration. According to Nate, failure to comply with ECHR rulings poses a significant threat to Ukraine's legal reputation, as well as delaying crucial structural reforms that are vital for attracting foreign investment and attaining EU membership. The author identifies the implementation of ECtHR decisions as a litmus test for the rule of law and democratic governance in Ukraine.

The consequences of Ukraine's persistent non-compliance with ECtHR judgments are illustrated most starkly in the case of *Burmich and Others v. Ukraine*, where thousands of applicants alleged systematic non-enforcement of prior court decisions. Pilkov (2022) conducted an analysis of the broader implications of this case, concluding that it reflected a systemic failure to reconcile domestic procedural law with international human rights obligations.

He advocates for enhanced procedural guarantees, targeted training for judges, and increased budgetary allocations to support enforcement.

From an economic standpoint, the inefficacy of implementing ECHR decisions has far-reaching implications. In their analysis of the economic implications of the Russia-Ukraine war, Audretsch et al. (2023) observe that the presence of institutional instability and legal uncertainty has had a detrimental effect on entrepreneurship and investment. The authors posit that effective enforcement of ECtHR rulings can mitigate some of these economic damages by signalling Ukraine's commitment to the rule of law and by enhancing investor confidence.

Furthermore, Liadze et al. (2023) reinforce this perspective by quantifying the macroeconomic losses incurred due to the war and legal dysfunction. The findings of the study indicate that Ukraine's failure to fulfil its obligations under the ECHR contributes to its economic stagnation by undermining the credibility of its legal and financial institutions. The results of this study underscore the necessity of judicial reform, which is not merely a legal imperative but also an economic necessity.

In their 2020 paper, Askari and Mirakhor propose a novel approach to the financial shortfalls experienced by Ukraine. The approach is to leverage the ECHR framework to facilitate the transfer of frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. It is contended by the aforementioned parties that the Convention provides a legal foundation for the restitution of damages caused by human rights violations, thereby establishing a linkage between legal enforcement and economic reparation. Should this approach be pursued, it has the potential to serve as a mechanism for funding the execution of ECtHR judgments, particularly in high-cost civil and criminal cases.

Furthermore, Kononenko (2015) provides empirical evidence on how IMF financial assistance has historically impacted Ukraine's economic growth. Despite an overarching focus on macroeconomics, he emphasises that fiscal responsibility and institutional credibility – encompassing the judiciary's capacity to enforce international decisions – are fundamental preconditions for economic recovery. This underscores the importance of robust legal institutions in securing external financial support.

Korovkin and Makarin (2020) examine the impact of armed conflict on economic networks. They observe that institutional disruptions induced by war, including judicial paralysis, can have a devastating impact on local economies. Their findings indirectly support the argument that rebuilding the judiciary's capacity to enforce ECtHR decisions is integral to stabilising the economy in post-conflict Ukraine.

Finally, Obrizan (2022) assesses the socioeconomic effects of war on poverty, displacement, and

unemployment. The author emphasises that legal uncertainty, especially with regard to access to justice and the enforcement of legal decisions, exacerbates the plight of vulnerable populations. This socio-legal dimension demonstrates that effective implementation of ECtHR rulings has the capacity to contribute to social cohesion and economic inclusion.

When considered as a whole, these studies illustrate the complex interplay between legal compliance and economic resilience in Ukraine. The prevailing consensus among researchers is unequivocal: the failure to implement ECtHR judgments, most notably within the contexts of civil and criminal proceedings, is a multifaceted problem that is deeply entrenched in institutional deficiencies and persistent underfunding. As such, the present study seeks to (1) identify and analyse the key economic and institutional barriers to the implementation of ECtHR decisions in Ukraine, and (2) propose feasible, economically grounded solutions for aligning national legal practices with the European Convention on Human Rights. The objective of this research is twofold: firstly, to contribute to academic understanding, and secondly, to the practical reform of Ukraine's legal and economic systems.

4. Research Results

Implementing the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Ukraine, particularly in civil and criminal proceedings, remains a pressing legal and economic issue. This section examines the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, the economic implications of non-compliance and best practices in other EU countries, shedding light on systemic weaknesses and potential reforms.

The *Burmich and Others v. Ukraine* case (European Court of Human Rights, 2017) highlights the chronic and systemic issue of Ukraine's failure to implement thousands of national judgements. This has led to repetitive findings of violations by the ECtHR. The *Burmich* judgment, which consolidated over 12,000 similar cases, was removed from the ECtHR's list of cases, leaving the responsibility with the Council of Europe to enforce a structural solution. Nevertheless, Ukraine persists in encountering challenges in implementing these rulings, a significant proportion of which pertain to civil cases concerning non-payment of pensions, social benefits, and labour disputes (Council of Europe, 2023b). The implementation of ECtHR judgments in Ukraine reveals a complex interplay of legal, economic, and institutional factors, particularly intensified by the ongoing war with Russia. Recent empirical studies provide robust data on how these factors constrain Ukraine's ability to comply with its international human rights obligations.

From an economic perspective, the war has significantly diminished Ukraine's ability to comply with ECtHR rulings. Audretsch et al. (2023) conducted a synthetic control study with the objective of quantifying the economic costs of the Russia–Ukraine war by examining lost entrepreneurial activity. Their research indicates that Ukraine has experienced a 43% decline in business formation compared to a counterfactual scenario without war. This decline in entrepreneurial dynamism has the effect of undermining economic recovery and reducing the state's fiscal capacity, thereby limiting its ability to fund the enforcement of ECtHR decisions, especially in civil and criminal proceedings. In a related study, Audretsch et al. (2023) examine the role of conflict in disrupting the institutional structures that are vital for economic development. They argue that the breakdown of legal and financial infrastructure undermines investor confidence and hinders foreign direct investment, both of which are essential for financing the public institutions responsible for implementing ECHR rulings. Their findings suggest that legal certainty and rights enforcement are essential for rebuilding Ukraine's economy.

The IMF (2021) highlights the importance of institutional credibility when it comes to securing external financial support. Its analysis shows that Ukraine's macroeconomic stability depends not only on fiscal and monetary reforms, but also on the strength of its judicial institutions. Failure to enforce ECtHR judgments effectively sends negative signals to international financial institutions and donors, which could result in reduced future assistance packages. As demonstrated by Kononenko (2015), IMF lending programmes have historically been contingent on Ukraine's institutional performance, particularly its adherence to rule-of-law principles. In the event of judicial bodies failing to enforce rights that have been recognised by the ECtHR, there is a corresponding erosion of the institutional trust that is necessary for the maintenance of a sustained economic partnership and development. From a structural perspective, Korovkin and Makarin (2020) explore the war's impact on production networks in Ukraine. It is evident that judicial dysfunction and institutional paralysis, particularly in conflict-affected regions, have had a disruptive effect on economic linkages that are indispensable for achieving regional recovery. This institutional breakdown encompasses the non-enforcement of legal decisions, including ECtHR judgments, thereby further destabilising already fragile local economies. Obrizan (2022) emphasises the social ramifications of institutional inefficiency, demonstrating that poverty, unemployment, and displacement have been compounded by the absence of legal redress mechanisms. It is particularly the case that vulnerable populations are affected by delays

or failures in the enforcement of ECtHR rulings, which has the effect of aggravating social fragmentation and undermining the government's legitimacy. Focacci et al. (2022) establish a correlation between the rule of law and national security, as well as economic resilience. It is noted that Russian influence has historically targeted institutional vulnerabilities in Ukraine. This encompasses the implementation of strategic disinformation campaigns and instances of corruption, which collectively serve to diminish the judiciary's capacity to function with autonomy. In such a context, the implementation of ECtHR judgments becomes both a legal and geopolitical issue, essential to national sovereignty and economic survival.

It is important to note that this backlog is not limited to civil proceedings. Within the criminal justice system, concerns persist regarding protracted pre-trial detention, instances of torture, and the absence of effective investigation into crimes. These issues have been identified as contributing factors to adverse ECtHR rulings. Notwithstanding the numerous legal reforms that have been implemented, Ukraine remains among the top five countries with the highest number of non-implemented ECtHR judgments (Department for the Execution of Judgments of the ECHR, 2024).

The economic repercussions of non-compliance are substantial. As Liadze et al. (2023) demonstrate, the existence of unresolved legal uncertainty and judicial dysfunction has a detrimental effect on both foreign direct investment (FDI) and private entrepreneurship. Ukraine's World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking exhibited a marked deterioration following 2014, a period which corresponded with both political instability and the ineffective enforcement of court decisions, including those of the ECtHR.

Furthermore, the financial burden of damages awarded by the ECtHR exerts significant pressure on the state budget. Between 2010 and 2023, Ukraine paid in excess of €50 million in satisfaction of claims made under Article 41 of the Convention, frequently for the purpose of civil compensation claims related to non-executed national judgments. Furthermore, these payouts have not been accompanied by reforms to prevent recurrence, leading to a cycle of legal liability without systemic correction (Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 2024).

Moreover, economic inefficiencies become evident at the institutional level. The State Treasury has been observed to demonstrate a tendency to delay the disbursement of compensation payments, a phenomenon that can be attributed to insufficient funding. Concurrently, the presence of procedural bottlenecks has been identified as a factor that hinders applicants from pursuing redress. The result is a legal environment that erodes public trust and undermines the state's economic credibility.

Notwithstanding the political declarations of European integration, the Ukrainian government has been unsuccessful in allocating sufficient funding to enforce ECtHR rulings. The Ministry of Finance has stated that the average annual budget allocated for the execution of ECtHR judgments constitutes less than 0.01% of the total state budget. This shortfall directly contradicts the 2014 Order of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (2014) (No. 291/7), which mandated the creation of a national mechanism for monitoring the enforcement of international legal decisions. Nevertheless, the working group established under this directive has yielded only limited outcomes due to inadequate financing and an absence of institutional autonomy.

Recent legislative efforts, such as amendments to the Law "On the Execution of Judgments and the Application of Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights," have made some progress by codifying state obligations and enabling administrative accountability. However, the effectiveness of enforcement remains limited at the regional and local levels, where the collaboration between the judicial and executive branches is frequently characterised by inefficiency (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2022).

A comparison of data from EU member states indicates that the successful implementation of ECtHR decisions is contingent on two factors: namely, centralised coordination and local accountability. For instance, Italy established an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Human Rights, which ensures consistent communication between courts, government agencies, and Parliament. Germany, for instance, has integrated the rulings of the ECtHR into its constitutional jurisprudence through the Federal Constitutional Court, thereby facilitating seamless compliance (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 2023).

In civil cases such as *Zhovner v. Ukraine* (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 2018) and *Ivanov v. Ukraine* (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 2019), the ECtHR ruled against the state for non-enforcement of domestic court decisions. These judgments demonstrate an absence of effective remedy in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention. Despite the introduction of a compensatory remedy law in Ukraine in 2014, its effectiveness remains minimal due to the vagueness of the criteria, the complexity of the procedures, and the insufficiency of funding.

In criminal proceedings, cases such as *Afanashev v. Ukraine* (European Court of Human Rights, 2005) and *Kaverzin v. Ukraine* (European Court of Human Rights, 2012) exposed systemic use of torture and inadequate investigation. Notwithstanding these rulings, Ukraine has not yet fully implemented safeguards against ill-treatment in pre-trial detention, nor has it ensured independent oversight of law

enforcement agencies. These deficiencies are indicative of more profound institutional issues within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General's Office.

To address these multifaceted challenges, the following policy recommendations are proposed:

The establishment of a permanent coordination body within the Ministry of Justice is recommended, with the remit of this body including the oversight of the implementation of ECtHR judgments. The duties of this body would also encompass budget planning and stakeholder engagement. The creation of a dedicated fund within the state budget is imperative for the execution of judgments. The annual allocations for this fund should be based on forecasted liabilities. It is imperative that there is an enhancement of the legal training received by judges, prosecutors and lawyers with regard to ECtHR jurisprudence and enforcement practices. The integration of ECHR compliance metrics into national judicial evaluations and anti-corruption monitoring frameworks is imperative. The adoption of EU models of ombudsman oversight is recommended in order to ensure civic participation and transparency in the implementation process.

Notwithstanding the evident strain on Ukraine's financial and administrative capacity wrought by the war with Russia, there is also an opportunity to reform dysfunctional institutions. It is imperative that the recovery and reconstruction process incorporates judicial reforms with the objective of enhancing compliance with international obligations. The alignment of the EU with the ECHR constitutes not merely a legal prerequisite for accession, but also a foundational element for the promotion of sustainable economic development.

The effective implementation of ECtHR rulings has the potential to enhance investor confidence, restore public trust in the rule of law, and signal Ukraine's readiness for deeper European integration. However, the implementation of such measures necessitates the presence of political will, adequate financing, and a commitment to institutional transformation.

The research reveals that the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decisions in Ukraine is significantly impeded by a combination of legal, institutional, and economic barriers. Of primary concern is the persistent underfunding of the judiciary and enforcement mechanisms, a situation that erodes the state's capacity to effectively execute legal judgments. As Izarova, Uhrynovska, and Hartman (2024) have noted, victims of human rights violations frequently encounter significant obstacles when seeking compensation, primarily owing to constrained financial and institutional resources.

From a legal standpoint, formal compliance with the ECHR has not been consistently enforced. As posited by Komarov and Tsuvina (2021), despite

the implementation of reforms within Ukrainian civil procedure that have been aligned with the jurisprudence of the ECHR, systemic issues such as procedural delays and inadequate legal training continue to persist. The case of *Burmich and Others v. Ukraine* is a pertinent example of this discrepancy between legal reform and practical enforcement, emphasising a pervasive failure to implement domestic judgements previously recognised by the ECtHR. Pilkov (2022) interprets this case as symptomatic of deeper structural deficiencies in Ukraine's legal system.

Further economic analysis demonstrates that non-compliance with ECtHR judgments has broader macroeconomic implications. According to Audretsch et al. (2023) and Liadze et al. (2023), legal uncertainty, particularly with regard to the enforcement of court decisions, has a negative impact on investment and entrepreneurship. Investors regard the failure to implement human rights judgments as indicative of weak rule of law and institutional instability, which in turn reduces Ukraine's attractiveness as an economic partner. This perception is particularly problematic in the context of post-war recovery and the pursuit of European Union membership (Nate, 2024).

The institutional framework for executing ECHR decisions is also characterised by fragmentation and limited coordination among key stakeholders, including the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary, and the legislature. The systemic-structural analysis confirms that the absence of a centralized enforcement strategy exacerbates inefficiencies and undermines accountability. This deficiency is particularly evident in high-cost civil and criminal cases, where state resources are inadequate to guarantee timely and comprehensive adherence to ECtHR judgments.

Moreover, the study identifies that Ukraine's current financial constraints significantly impede the state's capacity to fulfil its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. In their 2020 paper, Askari and Mirakhor put forward a potential remedy, which they describe as follows: the use of frozen Russian assets should be employed to fund the enforcement of ECtHR judgments. They go on to argue that such transfers should be regarded as lawful reparations for human rights violations. While the proposal is politically complex, it is argued that it represents a feasible economic strategy for addressing the shortfall in compliance funding.

In summary, the research findings confirm that Ukraine's inability to implement ECHR decisions results not only from legal or procedural shortcomings but also from a deep-seated lack of financial and institutional capacity. This multifaceted problem necessitates a comprehensive reform strategy that incorporates legal harmonisation, enhanced institutional coordination, and targeted economic investment in the justice system.

5. Conclusions

The study confirms that Ukraine faces a persistent and deeply rooted challenge in executing judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly in the spheres of civil and criminal justice. Despite the implementation of legislative measures intended to align national legislation with European standards, these reforms have largely failed to achieve their intended effect in practice. This failure can be attributed to the inadequacy of institutional frameworks and the persistent issue of inadequate funding.

The backlog of unexecuted judgments is indicative of systemic dysfunction. It is evident that numerous decisions remain unenforced, not due to legal ambiguity, but rather due to a combination of factors, including a lack of political will, inadequate judicial training, and the absence of reliable financial mechanisms. The institutions responsible for the enforcement of these policies operate under outdated procedures, poor coordination, and minimal oversight, further eroding public trust in the rule of law.

Failure to implement these judgements has broader economic consequences. Legal uncertainty undermines investor confidence and signals regulatory risk, delaying post-war recovery and economic growth. Furthermore, failing to provide victims with timely and adequate compensation deepens social injustice and fuels public dissatisfaction.

To address these challenges, Ukraine must adopt a comprehensive approach that combines legal, institutional, and financial reforms. The following recommendations are proposed:

The establishment of a Coordinated Enforcement Mechanism. The establishment of a centralised body or the assignment of a clear mandate to an existing institution to oversee and coordinate the enforcement of ECtHR judgments is recommended. This would ensure accountability, improve inter-agency communication, and streamline implementation processes.

The necessity of securing funding that is both stable and transparent is paramount. It is imperative that specific budget lines are allocated for the execution of judgments, including compensation payments and institutional support. The establishment of

a coherent financial strategy is imperative for ensuring sustainable and punctual compliance.

It is imperative that the judicial capacity is strengthened. It is imperative that continuous professional training is provided for judges and legal professionals on the application of European human rights standards. The enhancement of proficiency in this domain is expected to result in a decline in the occurrence of new violations and a concomitant facilitation of enforcement measures.

It is recommended that public monitoring and oversight be enhanced. The introduction of transparent mechanisms to track implementation progress is essential. Such mechanisms should include regular reporting to Parliament and public access to enforcement data. This approach would serve to promote accountability and maintain public trust.

It is important to explore alternative funding avenues. It is vital to identify innovative financial instruments, including the potential utilisation of external resources or reparative funds, to support the execution of costly judgements without unduly burdening the national budget.

The opportunity to learn from European best practices is also available. It is recommended that effective models from EU countries that have successfully managed ECtHR compliance through specialised agencies, targeted legislation, and sustainable financing strategies be adapted and applied.

The integration of the ECtHR implementation into a comprehensive set of reforms is paramount. It is essential to establish a correlation between the enforcement of ECtHR judgments and national development goals, as well as EU integration plans. This would elevate the issue to a political priority and help mobilise both domestic and international support.

In conclusion, the credibility of Ukraine as a rule-of-law-based democracy is contingent upon its capacity to fulfil its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Legislative amendments alone will not suffice. Institutional resilience, financial discipline, and political resolve are all essential to restoring trust in the legal system, improving the lives of citizens, and strengthening Ukraine's path toward European integration.

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