

## SECTION «POLITICAL SCIENCES»

### EXISTENTIALISM OF TURKISM IN THE CHOICE OF A COMMON PATH FOR THE STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA

Volodimir Grubov<sup>1</sup>

Igor Khraban<sup>2</sup>

Olena Dyka<sup>3</sup>

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.30525/978-9934-26-651-5-16>

**Abstract.** *The purpose.* The purpose of the study is to clarify the phenomenon of “Turkism” as a social theory and a certain political strategy, which, starting from the 90s of the 20th century, has become an outstanding tool of “soft power” for countries belonging to different geostrategic complexes. On the one hand, “Turkism” is present in the policy of Russia and Turkey, and on the other – in the Central Asian Five [“CA-5”]: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The history and weight of the influence of “Turkism“ on the spiritual and cultural life of the peoples of these countries has its own depth, peculiarities and special national and political content. The national and cultural inclusions of the CA-5 countries in the historical palette of “Turkism” have enriched the common history of the countries of the region and have become the spiritual basis for overcoming existing contradictions, socio-economic problems and the goals of the countries of the region for a better common future.

---

<sup>1</sup> Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the Chair of National Security, Public Management and Administration, State University “Zhytomyr Polytechnic”, Ukraine  
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3048-3280>

<sup>2</sup> Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Professor of the Chair of National Security, Public Management and Administration, State University “Zhytomyr Polytechnic”, Ukraine  
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3319-538>

<sup>3</sup> Associate Professor of the Department of National Security, Public Administration and Administration, State University “Zhytomyr Polytechnic”, Ukraine  
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0800-3498>

The achievement of the goal was facilitated by the tasks, the content of which is disclosed in three sections of the article. The sections are organically interconnected and reflect the mechanism for revealing the problem posed.

*Methodology.* The study was carried out on the basis of the use of comparative, dialectical, historical and systemic methods. This allowed us to examine “Turkism” as a phenomenon of a concrete-historical and spiritual-cultural manifestation of the collective “WE” of the peoples and ethnic groups of “CA-5”, starting from the early Middle Ages and up to the present day.

The combination of theoretical-methodological, political-applied and informational tools allowed us to clarify the most controversial pages of the interpretation of “Turkism” in the policies of neighboring countries and the events and facts of post-Soviet history, when in the “CA-5” countries “Turkism” turned into a “soft force” of state policy regarding the reformatting of the socio-economic and political foundations of national homes and the region as a whole reflect the mechanism for revealing the problem posed.

*Results.* The historical milestones of the emergence of the phenomenon of “Turkism” and its spread in the Central Asian region are specified. This provided grounds to determine the main thing – the direction of movement of “Turkism” from East to West, and not “the other way around”. This clearly supersedes the Turkish version, which since the time of Atatürk, Ankara has been persistently promoting in the international discourse and in the political space of neighboring countries. An example of this is the format of “Turkic peoples” in which Turkey insists on primacy and leadership for “anything”. The features of national practices of the policy of “Turkization” in the “CA-5” countries and the most critical points of social, political and cultural life are revealed. Problems and prospects for their solution are identified. Attention is drawn to the fact that the modern leadership of the “CA-5” countries understands that, first of all, it must ensure fundamental human rights and freedoms and the functioning of democratic institutions. Their basis should be social justice, the destruction of clannishness and the law.

*Practical implications.* The results of the study can be used in the block of humanitarian disciplines that consider issues of international politics, regional security and geopolitics.

*Value/originality.* The scientific novelty of the study lies in the disclosure of the ontological foundations of Central Asian Turkism as a special form of the spirit of expansionist aspirations of ancient Turkic tribes from the East to “new lands” to the West of the historical “Heartland” and the gradual introduction of the culture and rules of living within the first state formations to the peoples of Central Asia. It is stated that starting from the 6th – 7th centuries “soft power” through religion (Islam) and local traditions, and “hard power” through the state and law, which came together with the tribes from the East, gradually formed among the peoples of “CA-5” a peculiar civilizational and cultural code and features, the existential intentions of which this region still feels. The consideration of Turkism in the context of philosophical existence allowed us to see the human existence we experience in its historicity, factuality, contradictions, and aspirations for a better life of the most vulnerable segments of the population of the countries of the region.

*Conclusions.* The current geopolitical situation in the world is determined not only by the world order in its classical ontological sense [1], but also, as events of the last 20 years demonstrate, by new centers of power. One such center has become the Central Asian region and the self-proclaimed “CA-5”. Beginning in the 1990s, along with Turkey, the countries of the region – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan – became pioneers of a new trend in regional and global politics, which was associated with the root “Turk”. At the instigation of politicians in these countries, the terms “Turkic world”, “Turkism”, “pan-Turkism”, and other similar synonyms entered the mainstream. As time has shown, three events fueled the growing interest in Turks and Turkology. The first was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the “Central Asia-5” countries from Moscow. Zbigniew Brzezinski described the risks and hopes of modern global politics quite clearly in his famous work, “Chessboard” [2]. The second was Ankara’s efforts to create a “Turkic world” project under its auspices. The third was the entry of key geopolitical players – China, the United States, and the EU – into the region. Russia has not abandoned this region, but has merely reduced its activity due to internal problems. The phenomenon of “Turkism” [“Turkic world”] itself is apparently only just beginning to be explored by the countries of the region at the historical, cultural, educational, political, and, most importantly, conceptual levels.

As the political and economic situation in the countries of the region shows, the “Turkic world” project has found itself caught in the grip of an idealization of the past as a new “utopia of justice” and an objective reality dictated by economic weakness, poverty and, consequently, labor emigration, “relics of the past”, and the closed nature of the “club of the political elite”.

### 1. Introduction

For thousands of years the Turkic factor has played a significant role in the vast expanses of Eurasia and beyond. According to the latest data, the Turkic world extends from the Adriatic Sea to China and consists of 38 Turkic peoples with a population of over 300 million.

For the first time, beginning in the 2000s, the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia [since 1992, the countries of CENTRAL ASIA] found themselves in the mirror of big geopolitics for a general audience thanks to Zbigniew Brzezinski. His work “Chessboard” [2], which became a bestseller among the general reader [though not without deserved criticism from the expert community], attracted attention not so much for the author’s vision of the place and role of the Central Asian Five [“CA-5”] at the center of the historical “Heartland” [Mackinder’s geopolitical concept], but for his pragmatic approach to assessing the risks and potential dividends of this region for the geopolitical interests of the main global players. But Zbigniew Brzezinski was primarily interested in the national interests of the United States.

In retrospect, it can be assumed that the Central Asian 5 countries’ response to such prospects was the path of Turkism [as an alternative to the liberal development model] and the paradigm of practice and spirituality shaped by the collective memory of their peoples during their shared historical existence. The way out of the systemic crisis of orientation during the “era of change” of the 1990s for the peoples of these states was the familiar philosophical “existence” in its purely mental and de-ideologized [in political terms] sense. Its essence is quite simple: existentialism is a reflection of the history and soul of the national and cultural groups of the region’s [country’s] population.

In a philosophical sense the term “existentialism” [existence] refers to concrete being in its manifest form, where a person, their inner world, and

the world around them form a system of interconnections. It [existentialism] is viewed as directly experienced human existence in its factuality, where it [human existentialism] is not reducible to abstractions and therefore cannot be fully understood by rational methods, but exists as the sum of the possibilities and planes of real life. That is, a certain connection between a person's inner world and the world of reality, the world of their coexistence as an objective given.

For example, for J.P. Sartre, the phenomenon of existentialism is associated not only with coexistence but also with the presence of essence within this coexistence. Therefore, for Sartre, humanism emerges as a means of moral education as a permanent act of "responsibility" and a moral way of life. It [humanism] goes beyond the boundaries of ethical theory and becomes an instrument for the creation of a new person, a new society where moral responsibility for "freedom" is present as a social norm – a "conscious necessity" [3, pp. 319-345]. Sartre's existentialism appeals to the individual, stimulating them to rational action, freed from the enchantment of the everyday. Humanism, in turn, is intertwined with human originality and the creative activism of the individual to change the world for the better.

In this regard, for example, for M. Heidegger, in the society of the technological revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, which brought a comfortable lifestyle to humanity, a person with "meaningful reflection" on social processes – reality and consequences – is essential. For only such a person is capable of understanding the depth of ongoing changes. The apparent success of our time conceals the depth of the crisis of humanity, as the measure of the sensory world, good and evil, which resides within man from his nature [4] and his spiritual world. Hence, existentialism seeks what truly exists, not abstract truths.

Since beginning in the 1990s the states of the Central Asian Five have embarked on a search for such a fateful path. Finding themselves at the center of the geopolitical "Heartland" and the pragmatics of "marginal gain" policies for major geopolitical players, they have chosen to master the art of "maneuvering" between centers of power. The foundation of this strategy has become "Turkism", a time-tested source of wisdom and caution in times of conflicting national histories and external challenges. Moreover, the situation has been complicated by two factors. The first was that the

elites of the time had clearly insufficient experience in nation-building. The second was that the rules of the all-pervasive morality of the new world's "market" has been demanded "endless concessions" which ultimately has threatened defeat.

## 2. Turkism as an existence of the historical reality of the Central Asian Five

For the newly formed states of Central Asia, which found themselves at a crossroads in the political prospects of national development in the 1990s, the search for a foundation – that is, something that truly exists – became a central question of preserving national identity and independence. Only with time did the peoples of these states understand the true depth of the risks inherent in a space of "freedom" without borders and the intricacies of the liberal values politics of its leading players. The historical parallel between Turkism and existentialism allows us, on the one hand, to see the efforts of the elites and societies of the Central Asian countries to find a unique national path of socio-economic and cultural development that would highlight the region's ethno-national identity in a rapidly changing world. On the other hand, it is necessary to understand the specifics and prospects of "Turkism" as a format for social world order in the countries of Central Asia at the current stage of historical development, as an alternative to well-known guiding historical "isms" such as capitalism [liberalism] or socialism [Marxism-Leninism]. Given the weight of the religious factor in the spiritual life of the region and the challenges of nation-building, these two tasks have become paramount for the Central Asian Five, judging by the political activity of the countries' leadership.

Regarding the etymology of the terms "Turkism" and "Turks", three points of view can be discerned in the historiography of this phenomenon. Briefly, their essence is as follows. *The European school* views the Turks as a "yellow race, a barbarian tribe that invaded Europe from Central Asia". In this approach, the five-volume *Histoire générale des Huns, des Turks, des Mogols, et des autres Tartares occidentaux* [History of the Occupied Lands], published in Paris in 1756 by Joseph de Guignes, does not deny the significance of the Turks in European history and culture, especially since it discusses the trade and military-political relations between the Roman

Empire and the Turkic states of Central Asia in the early Middle Ages. This period spans the sixth to eighth centuries.

We are talking about Turkism as a unique historical socio-spiritual project of the peoples of the heartland of the historical “Heartland” [including the Central Asian region] and adjacent territories which, as history shows, existed from 552 to 603. Its origins/foundations were formed by a medieval state – the Khaganate in Asia [modern-day Mongolia and adjacent regions of the Russian Siberian region from the Urals to Yakutia], created by the unification of local tribes – led by rulers from the Ashina clan. The peoples of Central Asia became part of the Turkic Khaganate in 566 as a result of Istemi Khagan’s campaign to the West in 554. Later, the Khaganate split into two formally unified entities – the Western Turkic Khaganate (603-658) and the Eastern Turkic Khaganate (603-744) which included the modern states of Central Asia [5].

From the perspective of the timeframe of the coexistence of these state-formed [empires], this is the lifespan of two or three generations [based on the average life expectancy of a person at that time]. But from the perspective of grand politics and the revival of the spirit of national self-awareness in the countries of the region, “Turkism” is a significant event – a milestone marking the participation of these countries’ peoples in the global civilizational process and their presence in the grand politics of the time. After all, Rome like ancient Greece is a cultural cradle for both the peoples of Europe and those of neighboring and distant lands. In the transition of concepts in contemporary global geopolitics, this fact has a certain [critical] significance. Moreover, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries this issue became a problem of grand politics in Europe, and it was Turkey that posed it.

*The Turkish approach* to “Turkism” was clearly defined by the leader of the Turkish Revolution and the first president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. As a revolutionary who dreamed of changing the country, which was experiencing the problems of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire [1453-1918], he believed that national history should be written by the people themselves by changing their consciousness. In 1923 Mustafa Kemal set the Council of Professors of Istanbul University the task of completing national independence in the fields of science and education, which implied reconsidering the merits of Greek civilization as

the center where world civilization was born and restoring historical justice regarding the civilization of the “Turkic peoples” [6]. As early as 1930, the first scholarly work, “Fundamentals of Turkish History”, appeared, and in 1931 a new expanded version of history emerged. According to the concept of Turkic history, the ancestors of the Turks are brachycephals who left their homeland from Central Asia and settled in the Mediterranean basin between 3000 BC and 1200 BC.

In the language of modern political science, Atatürk’s plan looked like a reformatting of the rules of the “soft power” game, where the national-cultural dimension comes into play first, followed by the international-expansionist one. This was clearly manifested in Atatürk’s two-pronged strategy:

a) the term “Turk” became synonymous with “Turkish”, which as historians note, on the one hand, was supposed to smooth over the “unpleasant costs” of the Islamization policy within the Ottoman Empire [1453-1918], and on the other, to remove from the public consciousness the negative connotations of the term “Turk”, which primarily referred to the population of the hinterland with the psychology of the average citizen. Its sound was perceived as a denigration of national identity and the greatness of the people;

b) “Turk” and “Turkism” began to be positioned as a unified cultural principle/civilizational space/mentality of neighboring peoples who profess Islam. This subsequently facilitated a rapprochement between the elite, the new revolutionary political class, and the masses from the hinterlands. The result of this process was to be Turkish unity and social justice, as demanded by the laws of the revolution. According to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s plan, the Turkish Republic, as a reflection of Western political culture, modernity, secularism, and the pacification of eternally conflicting group interests, was to act as the guarantor of these plans.

There’s a noteworthy fact here. The Ottoman Empire embarked on a course of Westernization, of rapprochement with Europe, as early as 1839. The vanguard of this policy was the national elite, who has embraced European values and its key component – the army – of which Atatürk himself was a part. As historians note, Atatürk was a nationalist and a purely Turkish figure, whose victories lent him nation-building charisma. Atatürk strove to create a nation-state. And this is what defined modern Turkey.

Over time, at the national [within Turkey] level, this gave “Turkism” the power of social attraction among various social groups and layers through the national education system [new curricula and history textbooks] and became an impetus for various strata of the population to become active in the political life of the country.

The power and benefit as the end result of such a strategy was seen by one of the founders of the ideology of Turkism, a native of Russia, Y u. Akchura, in the following: “the main advantage of such a policy is that it would unite all the Turks living in Asia and in the eastern regions of Europe and united by a common language, ethnicity and religion” [6]. Turkey began to actively pursue this goal in the early 90s of the 20th century, when the national elites of the once united country and neighboring countries began to actively use the “fruits of the era of the fall” of the USSR, pursuing their geopolitical interests. The strategy and geography of the “Turkism” policy of modern Turkey can be judged, at least, by the presence in the office of the President of Turkey R.T. Erdogan of the “globe of the Turkic world”. The fact that Turkey has put itself at the head of this project does not raise any doubt, as well as the fact that in the history of Turkey R.T. Erdogan sees himself as the second Atatürk [7], and in to himself, in the eyes of the Turkish people, his charisma.

But here, as they say, one must recognize two major differences: the Ottoman Empire is a phantom ache for past greatness, and “one cannot step into the same water twice”. The Turkic project, however, is the hope for its revival. Its contours were first outlined in 2002 in Ahmet Davutoglu’s work “Strategic Depth. Turkish Foreign Policy” [8]. In his view, Turkey’s strategy should consist of “subtle diplomacy” based on “strategic depth”. That is, returning its influence to the regions of the historical Ottoman Empire and promoting the “fortitude” of Turkish identity and its narratives in neighboring states. In this regard, the Turkish world of the post-Soviet space was ideally suited for the project of reviving a “great Turkey”.

*The Russian approach* to the question of “Turkism” is historical, cultural, and organic. The spirit of the multifaceted culture of the “Turkic world” has been present in the vast expanses of modern Russia since the Turkic Khaganate of the 6th century and its first steps toward establishing trade, diplomatic, and military relations with the Roman Empire. All of central Russia, beginning with modern-day Tatarstan, the Volga region,

Yakutia, and Eastern Siberia – the peoples inhabiting this vast territory – can rightfully be considered a synthesis of the distinct cultural phenomena of the Turkic ethnic groups, where the Turkic model of worldview and understanding has a distinct place in the history of Russian statehood.

The picture of Russia's "Turkic world" is quite comprehensive. As Russian experts note today, it represents both the original areas of peoples historically located in Russia and national and ethnic groups, such as the Kazakhs, as a result of emigration. Historically, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Kумыks, and Yakuts have lived in Russia [9].

As of 2023, the number of these peoples was: Tatars – 5 million 310 people which is 3.8% of the country's population, Bashkirs – 1 million 58 thousand, Chuvashes – 1 million 58 thousand, Kумыks – 503 thousand, Yakuts – 466 thousand people [9].

The majority of Tatars live in Tatarstan, the middle Volga region, Siberia, and the Far East. The ethnonym "Tatars" appeared in historical documents between the 15th and 17th centuries. The ethnonym "Bashkirs" also appeared in the Middle Ages, and linguists are still studying its origins. After the collapse of the Golden Horde and the annexation of Kazan, the Tatars and Bashkirs became part of the Russian Empire.

Before joining the Russian Empire, the Chuvash ethnic group was pagan. Currently, most Chuvashes are Christians, while a small number are Sunni Muslims. Half of the Chuvash ethnic group lives in Chuvashia, while the rest gradually settled in other regions of the Russian Federation.

The Kумыks are the oldest and third largest people in Dagestan. Unlike other Caucasian peoples, the Kумыks are the largest Turkic-speaking people in the North Caucasus. Long-term interaction between Turkic, European-speaking tribes and local Caucasian peoples led to the completion of the formation of the Kумыk ethnic group by the 17th century. Kумыks live in Dagestan's Kумыk Highlands, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Tyumen Oblast, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Stavropol Krai, Moscow Oblast, and other regions of the country [9].

Today, the above-mentioned peoples within Russia have national-territorial entities, which, on the one hand, emphasizes their national-cultural identity, and on the other, the right to resolve certain political and socio-economic issues in accordance with the legislative framework of Russia.

It's noteworthy that, since the 1990s, Ankara has shown a particular interest in these peoples, and this is understandable. One of the founders of the ideology of Turkism [pan-Turkism], Yury Akchura, was a native of Russia [modern-day Tatarstan]. Characteristically, he was a proponent not simply of Turkism, but of its more active and expansionist model – pan-Turkism. In Akchura's approach, pan-Turkism was viewed both as a tool for transforming the Ottoman Turkey into a secular state and as a tool for its expansion into adjacent territories inhabited by other Muslim peoples. In 1904, his major work, "Three Types of Policy", was published. In it, he examined three options for choosing a national ideological doctrine to save the weakening the Ottoman Empire – pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, and Ottomanism – and argued for the priority of pan-Turkist ideology over pan-Islamism and Ottomanism [6]. In his view, it was pan-Turkism that gave "Turkism" the vital energy of society and strength to the state in the world's struggle for a "place in the sun".

As the history of Turkey's expansionist policy has shown, his [Yu. Akchur's] views have become a distinctive political and philosophical foundation for nation-building and the recognizability of Turkey's image in the modern political world. And if in the 1990s, Boris Yeltsin's Russia viewed the policy of "pan-Turkism" as one of the ways to "softly sovereignize" the regions of a large country [Tatarstan, for example, "take as much sovereignty as you can handle"], then, beginning in the 2000s – the era of Vladimir Putin's Russia – the era of "soft power" of foreign [Turkish] influence ended. Turkey was shown its true "place" in big politics and its internal national problems [the Kurdish problem], where Ankara, instead of "soft power", demonstrated harshness, a military approach, and a complete inability to negotiate.

### **3. Turkism in Post-Soviet Central Asia**

The ideas of "Turkism" in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia became popular in the 1990s. At that time, the region's political elites found themselves at a crossroads in their nation-building and searching for loyal allies who would not abandon them in the turbulent sea of national interests. The figure of Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin, played a significant role in this. In his quest for power and his policy of decommunization, he virtually forgot about the coexistence of the countries of the region as part of

a single historical and economic space – a union state built on the principle of unity and the national and cultural diversity of its constituent republics. Resentment is another matter – in big politics, this phenomenon is always and everywhere present. And in the maxim “The East is a delicate matter”, the spirit of a permanent play of meanings is reflected not so much by the figures themselves as by the background against which they are depicted. At the same time, we should not forget how the elites of the region’s countries behaved in the newly opened “space of opportunity”, when social problems collided with the selfish interests of national groups and the division of power at the center and in the regions.

The author of the work “The Origin and Evolution of Turkism”, R. Mukhammetdinov, saw the solution to the problem of finding partners/support in Turkism as “a system of ideas stemming from the recognition of the ethnic origin, linguistic kinship, and cultural closeness of the Turkic peoples, promoting the unity, brotherhood, and cooperation of peoples which will facilitate their advancement along the path of progress and prosperity” [6]. This version of an academic and lofty understanding of the laws and subtleties of big politics, regarding “progress and prosperity” which is rather dubious on the part of Turkey [big politics], deserves a little more analysis of the facts of realities on the ground. Some time has passed since the ideas of “Turkism” conquered the public consciousness of the Asian Five countries, and the first results are already visible.

The first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was at the forefront of the “Turkic” project in Central Asia and, rightfully, its pioneer. As an experienced politician of the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, he relied on two factors. First, the Soviet legacy made Kazakhstan an economic leader in the region and, through the Baikanur Cosmodrome, a country involved in international space programs. Second, as an experienced politician, he skillfully played up the theme of “Turkic heritage” in the historical fate of modern Kazakhstan, where 25 of the 40 known Turkic ethnic groups lived [and continue to live] in the country.

His views and approaches to the nation-building of modern Kazakhstan and the policy of identity formation were based on three program documents. As the authors of the article “Turkology of Kazakhstan in the system of Eurasian coordinates” claim, it was they who determined the content of the entire domestic policy of the state in this matter which was the key to

the success of the national project. First of all, this affected the spheres of science, culture and education:

- “Mangilik El”;
- “Rukhani zhangyru” – “Modernization of public consciousness”;
- “Seven facets of the Great Steppe”.

Soon, the state’s efforts to fulfill the assigned tasks were supported by the project “Turkic civilization: from origins to modernity” [10]. That is, we are talking about the spheres of “soft power”, about the substantive side of the spirit of peoples, as the basis for the unity of ethnic communities and the formation of a nation.

It is noteworthy that “Seven Facets of the Great Steppe” [2018] is the fruit of President N. Nazarbayev’s reflections on the country’s past and future in search of the foundations of statehood. This concerns the ethnocultural code not only of Kazakhstan but also of the countries of the region. For the first time, the crisis of the Eurocentric approach in historical research was addressed at the level of the head of state. In the president’s view, “the Eurocentric point of view obscured the real fact that the Sakas, Huns, and proto-Turkic ethnic groups were part of the ethnogenesis of our nation” [10]. The work presents Kazakhstan as a vast network hub, linking proto-Turkic and Turkic tribes, giving new life to ethnic groups and states. But the author’s main assertion that “Kazakhstan is the cradle of Turkic civilization” clearly contradicts the previously stated position of Turkey which has appropriated the palm in this historical race and does not intend to give it up.

Several other strategies also exist and are being implemented within the framework of the “Turkic” project named after President N. Nazarbayev. The first is related to the conversion of Kazakhstan’s written language to the Latin alphabet [the goal of which is “Modernization of Public Consciousness” – 2018], which, according to the president, will help Kazakhstan become more closely connected with the Turkic peoples and enter global civilization. However, due to certain circumstances [labor emigration to Russia], this process was delayed until the end of 2025. It will likely be adjusted again, delaying the implementation deadline. In Uzbekistan, this program was launched in early 2023 [11].

This policy of “dragging out the language problem” over time is dictated by two factors. The first relates to the Russian community in the region

[the rights of national minorities], and the second relates to labor emigration to Russia from countries in the region. The Solomonic solution to the language issue was the agreement reached at the 2023 CIS summit which defined the status of the Russian language. It was recognized as a tool for interethnic communication, and at the national level, the countries of the region committed to making it a subject in secondary and higher education.

The president's second strategy involves moving the state capital to the historic city of Turkestan, one of the most ancient cities in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Nazarbayev believes that Turkestan is a spiritual sanctuary for the Turkic world [10]. Nazarbayev's assertion that Turkestan could become a "platform for Central Asian integration" testifies to the intensifying competition for leadership in Central Asia.

It is also noteworthy that, under the patronage of President N. Nazarbayev, the Turkic Academy was opened in the Palace of Peace and Reconciliation in May 2010. It received international status and became a unifying international political, scientific, educational, and cultural center, within which steps were taken to write a unified Turkic history from ancient times to the 15th century [10].

The newly elected President of Kazakhstan, K. Tokayev (2022), proposed incorporating the principle of "national unity, peace, and harmony", which had already been realized in the Golden Horde, into the concept of "Turkism". Its content is proposed to be linked to a common origin, a shared culture and language, a connection with the global world, and the spiritual roots and heritage of a large region. In this context, the presidential message was quite clear: "The Golden Horde and Eurasianism are important elements of the cultural code of the Kazakhs" [10]. This means that the new President of Kazakhstan, having expanded the boundaries of the "Turkic world", calls for the Turkic project to be viewed not as a fact of civilizational embodiment or a model of human practice on a regional scale, privatized by politicians and certain scientific approaches, but as a synthesis of the cultural practices of indigenous and neighboring peoples in their multifaceted historical connections. That is, from trade and war to migrations and great migrations in space and time. It should be noted that in May 2019, a large forum "The Great Steppe: Cultural Heritage and Role in World History" was held, where a separate panel session was dedicated to the 750th anniversary of the Golden Horde [10].

Unlike Kazakhstan, the leaders of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan appear more reserved, even aloof, in their attitude toward the Turkish project of “Turkism”/“Turkic world”. There are several reasons for this. The first and most irritating is Turkey’s position which has monopolized this project in an attempt to restore its own glory from oblivion. This clearly reflects nostalgia for the era of the “Ottoman Empire” and vengeance against the European Union for Brussels’ “undated” delays in its EU membership. As for Russia (the USSR), there are historical grievances stemming from wars in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Crimea, as well as defeats in the First and Second World Wars, where Ankara was always against Russia.

The second reason follows from the first: the division of the Turkic world into Turkic leaders and Turkic outsiders. Here, an analogy with the worlds of R. Aron [in his work “Peace and War Between Nations”] is appropriate, where, as the author notes, the modern world still operates by the rules of “center-periphery” [12]. In the spirit of the expansionist history of this rule, Ankara immediately showed all member countries “who is boss”. As experts note, this was particularly evident in Turkey’s cultural initiatives within the framework of the Turkic project [1993], the main goal of which was to reformat and fill the consciousness of the population of the “CA-5” countries with cultural and historical narratives of Turkish authorship. According to Ankara’s plans, Turkic was to become the main instrument of Turkish “soft power” in the policy of conquering the region. However, from the moment of its launch, the Central Asian republics did not like the ethnonymic designation of their peoples as “external Turks”, and the more daring “Uzbek Turk”, etc. [10]. This fact clearly indicated the absolute nature of the misunderstanding or deliberate manipulation of the history of the region by Ankara and the desire of the latter’s leadership to outline the “lines” of behavior of the members of the new format at any cost.

This instance of “Turkish greatness” did not go unnoticed. It was Uzbek President Islam Karimov who first responded. His first step was to join forces with Nursultan Nazarbayev in rejecting Ankara’s proposal to create a supranational coordination center for the Turkic states. This clearly infringed on the sovereignty of the countries in the region. The second step was that both presidents amended the frequency of summit meetings and the “binding implementation of decisions” of the Turkic states’

summits, making them dependent on national interests and global political developments. The dynamics of the Turkic project were also clouded by disagreements between Astana and Tashkent over regional leadership and the demarcation of the Caspian Sea, with its oil and gas wealth. Here, the interests of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, clearly converged. Tashkent also reacted sharply to Ankara's provision of political asylum to opposition leader M. Salih [leader of the Erk party] [13]. The recall of the Uzbek ambassador was a signal to Turkey that the country's leadership would not tolerate such unfriendly steps. This step demonstrated that Uzbekistan would not tolerate a Turkish presence in matters of national security.

The peak of the political “understatements” of the 1990s was the absence of the presidents of Uzbekistan, I. Karimov, and Turkmenistan, S. Niyazov, from the 2000 Baku Summit of the Turkic States. Experts state that the root cause of this line of behavior by the leaders of these countries was due to their disagreement with Turkey's “line” of excessive activity in achieving dominance in the region. Unlike Azerbaijan, whose leadership clearly actively supported this strategy, they demonstrated that they clearly did not like the “figure of the big brother” in the region [13]. The emerging trend of “coolness in relations” was also demonstrated at the 2001 Istanbul Summit, where the leader of Uzbekistan, I. Karimov, was absent, and the president of Turkmenistan, S. Niyazov, accused Turkey of pursuing “purely political interests” [13].

Overall, the expert community is rather lukewarm regarding the prospects of a Turkish version of “Turkism”. Turkey is foreign here both in its “spirit of cooperation” and in its historical relationship to this world of regional-local civilizational embodiment of human community within the system of a multinational and historical-temporal collective “WE”. Experts note that the Turkish vector has not become dominant in the foreign policy of any country in the region [13]. Contrary to Ankara's political ambitions, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan consider themselves the cradle of Turkic civilization, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have chosen their own version of state-building philosophy. This strategy of national-state development demonstrates that they do not wish to revolve in the orbit of Ankara's worldview, preferring multi-vectorism and prospects for economic development to Turkish uniformity.

In response to the cooling spirit of the Asian Five toward Turkey's regional policy, Ankara hastened to "soften" its rhetoric in diplomatic and public spheres. For example, this includes assurances and recognitions from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In public, he has repeatedly emphasized that Turkey's role in the region should be viewed as "a common good for everyone". In October 2019, at a meeting of the Turkic Council in Baku, he also stated that he does not separate the Central Asian countries from Turkey. In his words, "Turkestan is our ancestral home, our main source. We are all a large family of 300 million people who speak the same language, belong to the same religion, have the same history, culture, and share the same civilization". I emphasized, "that our Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen brothers look at Turkey in the same way we do. They consider our country their home". The Turkish president also made sure to mention Bukhara and Samarkand, the historical, cultural, and spiritual centers of the Turkic world located in Uzbekistan.

However, there is one critical point to these statements from the Turkish leader: 2028. This is the date when R.T. Erdoğan's term as president ends. He made this statement on March 8, 2024, at a meeting with the TUGVA youth group in Istanbul. This means that new "political winds" could bring new geopolitical realities for Turkey and the "Turkic world" project.

#### **4. Critical Points of Existence for Turkism in Central Asian Countries**

We've previously clarified that, in the philosophical sense, the term "existence" refers to concrete being in its manifest form, where a person, their inner world, and the world around them form a system of "subject-object" relationships. Secondly, existence is viewed as directly experienced human existence in its factuality, where it [existence] exists as the sum of the possibilities and planes of real life. In other words, we're talking about a certain connection between a person's inner world and the world of reality, the world of their coexistence, as an objective given. Simply put, it's the well-being of a specific "I" in a system of collective participation – "I am a person/We are people/We are all a community".

Regarding the political present and the prospects of "Turkism", it's appropriate to recall Hegel, who linked the fate of peoples and states to the "global interpretation of historical conservatism". A human community organized into a "state of power" derives its vitality from a historical idea.

And if such an idea is absent or ceases to meet the needs of the era, the community begins to lose its substance and is increasingly less able to realize the values of culture [12, p. 294].

In this formulation of the question regarding the achievements of the “Turkic project” in the countries of the region, the populations of these states have more questions than the authorities have answers. For example, World Bank experts on the countries of the region for 2025, regarding critical points in the existence of Turkism in the countries of Central Asia, state the following. Based on existing political and socioeconomic problems, they see the key to the success of the countries of the region in the policy of “soft power”. Two-thirds of future economic growth, they believe, will result from investments in human capital and the mobilization of its potential. This means:

- access to quality education from an early age;
- provision of children and adolescents with modern healthcare and healthy nutrition;
- social protection systems that support families;
- employment and training programs for youth, including girls and young women;
- expanding access to water, sanitation, and a safe urban environment.

In other words, we are talking about systemic problems that have been building up for years.

Experts also believe that if these measures are implemented, Central Asia will be able to capitalize on its greatest asset – a young, energetic, and numerous generation, which will shape the region in 2050. In this strategy, the republics’ authorities will also have to make a difficult choice between their national vision of development prospects and the “spirit” of Turkish “soft power” projects. This includes the Turkish Agency for International Cooperation, the International Organization of Turkic Culture, the Yunus Emre Center, the Hizmet Lyceum network, and other projects. In other words, the first issue is youth and education as the foundation of the country’s future.

The second problem, no less profound and serious, is the issue of women. It should be noted that, since the 1990s, countries in the region have acceded to and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW] which was adopted by

the UN General Assembly in 1979. Based on an analysis of reports from national institutions that oversee these issues within countries, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women almost annually notes “high levels of gender-based violence against women, including a sharp increase in cases of domestic violence” in all countries. For example, in Uzbekistan, according to the Family and Women’s Committee, 21,871 protection orders were issued to women victims of violence in the first seven months of 2023.

As experts noted, at the end of 2024, Uzbekistan improved its position in the gender equality rankings, rising to 52nd place globally and surpassing its regional neighbors [20]. It is noteworthy that since 2019, the Uzbek authorities have adopted more than 20 laws and regulations aimed at protecting women’s rights and improving their social status which are “revolutionary” in content for the general public. These include, for example, the law “On Guarantees of Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men” [2019], the law “On the Protection of Women from Harassment and Violence” [2019], etc. [14].

The leadership of other countries in the region has followed a similar path. For example, in 2009, Kazakhstan adopted two laws: “On State Guarantees of Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities for Men and Women” and “On the Prevention of Domestic Violence”. In Kyrgyzstan, the law “On State Guarantees of Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities for Men and Women” [2008]. The law is identical to the version of the law in Kazakhstan. In Tajikistan, the law “On State Guarantees of Equal Rights for Men and Women and Equal Opportunities for Their Implementation” [2004] was adopted. Similar laws were also adopted in Turkmenistan [15].

It’s worth remembering here that the roots of this phenomenon are obvious. They are defined by the history and way of life of nomadic peoples. Here, the eternal struggle for survival and living space was closely intertwined with the male population’s military service within state entities. This burden on men's shoulders greatly influenced the size of the male population and the nature of masculinity in the public consciousness. The history of the region has preserved this particular social organization of “steppe and mountain life” in the collisions of “tradition” and “law”, as defined norms of relationships and the social status of men and women.

These norms became entrenched both in the socio-cultural space and in the depths of public consciousness.

The treatment of women as “things” in the hands of men and their relatives, where priority was always given to “Adat” [custom] and “Sharia” right up until the beginning of the 20th century, is described in the work “The Status of Women Among the Nomads of Central Asia”. In 1896 O. Shkapsky published this account in the Central Asian Herald [Tashkent]. He stated that “the human personality of women in this world of the cultural existence of the peoples of the region is not recognized by Adat. Her right to choose is taken away” [16].

The image of “female slavery” was altered only in the early 1920s – a time of revolutionary social change. As representatives of the national historical school note, its inception was the “Khujum” movement – an attack on old foundations and the liberation of women from seclusion and segregation. But despite the fact that this movement led to women no longer wearing the ritual veil “burqa”, they believe, this did not change the public perception of women as controlled, weak, dependent, and therefore second-class creatures [15]. The socioeconomic problems of the “transition period” of the 1990s, the colossal deindustrialization of the region, and the rise of poverty among the majority of the population led to the strengthening of traditionalism and its return to social forms of communal life. This primarily affected the institution of the family – the phenomenon of polygamy, women’s prospects for employment in prestigious jobs, women’s participation in the country’s socio-political life, etc. In these matters, masculinity created strong competition for women.

The third problem is the outflow of population from the Central Asian-5 countries. Here, it’s necessary to consider two interconnected processes – emigration and the deindustrialization of the region – which essentially have the same root: a paradigm shift in the model of socio-political and socio-economic development. That is, a shift in the fundamental foundations of society as a coordinate system that guaranteed sources of livelihood, development, and security. Regarding the first component [emigration], beginning in the 1990s, the so-called “transition period”, it primarily affected Kazakhstan and the Russian-speaking portion of the country’s population. Statistics for the period 1990-2000 show that more than 3.5 million people emigrated from the country. This was primarily the

Russian-speaking population which represented an “army” of technicians, engineers, doctors, teachers, qualified managers, and other specialists. The motivation for changing place of residence was associated with two factors: industrial decline and the cultural and linguistic policy of the authorities within the framework of “a return to cultural roots”. As a result, Kazakhstan faced a shortage of personnel in many industries. In the last decade, the number of “permanent” emigrants to Russia and to countries of the “far abroad” has amounted to between 330,000 and 340,000 people [17]. The picture of emigration from Kazakhstan is complemented by representatives of other ethnic groups. For example, according to data from the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan for 2016-2020, 12.6 thousand [6.7%] Ukrainians, 4.7 thousand [2.5%] Tatars, and 14.9 thousand [7.9%] Germans left the country [18]. At the same time, according to the same Bureau, as of January 1, 2025, 20.3 million people lived in Kazakhstan, including 14.5 million Kazakhs [71.3%] and almost 3 million Russians [14.6%]. More than half of the republic’s total Russian population lives in the six northern regions: East Kazakhstan [44.2% of residents], North Kazakhstan [44.4%], Kostanay [33.5%], Karaganda [31.1%], Pavlodar [28.9%], and Akmola [26.3%] [19].

Emigration of the Russian-speaking population from other countries of the region is primarily associated with internal political conflicts and instability. Thus, emigration to the Russian Federation from Uzbekistan, where clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks occurred in the summer of 1989, increased from 12.3 to 41.6 thousand people in 1990, and to 65 thousand in 1991. Emigration from Kyrgyzstan, where clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks occurred in the summer of 1990, increased from 5 thousand in 1989 to 21.2 thousand in 1990. And this despite the fact that the collapse of the USSR and the sovereignty of the union republics throughout 1990 and most of 1991 had not yet become a fait accompli [18].

In the context of growing social problems in the Central Asian region and increasing socio-territorial inequality, the current economic situation is stimulating labor emigration of residents of the region’s countries, estimated at 3-4 million people. The primary destination for these people is Russia, where the foreign labor force represents 6-8% of the total workforce in the countr.

## Section «Political sciences»

On the one hand, the growth of emigration from the region was driven by poverty in the least developed countries, and on the other, by the economic boom from 2000 to 2019 in Russia and Kazakhstan, where labor shortages were felt. The main source countries for labor emigration were Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In this regard, the “Income Gap” table for the countries of the region provides a compelling argument in motivating residents of the “CA-5” countries to emigrate for labor.

### Income Gap: Average Monthly Nominal (%)

Countries	1990 p.	2005 p.	2021 p.
Kazakhstan	83.3	84.5	71.7
Kyrgyzstan	67.1	21.1	32.1
Russia	100.0	100.0	100.0
Tajikistan	67.5	8.9	17.7
Uzbekistan	66.8	22.3	36.1

Personal remittances received [% of GDP, 2021]: Kyrgyzstan – 32.7%, Tajikistan – 33.4%, Uzbekistan – 13.3%, Kazakhstan – 0.2%.

Since 2020 Russia’s leadership has adopted a policy of tightening labor emigration regulations and establishing basic order in this area, both among employers and in terms of the country’s needs in certain employment sectors. The main requirements have become education, qualifications, work experience in the relevant field, and language proficiency. Labor migration statistics to Russia from Central Asian countries for 2021 and 2022 are as follows [20]:

### Labor Migration Statistics in the CIS. 2021- 2022

2021			2022	
TOTAL Employment			TOTAL Employment	
Total arrivals:	2,597,974	12,118,564	3,469,256	14,119,188
From CIS countries:	2,534,961	0,850,699	3,394,625	10,585,349
Kazakhstan:	52,429	1,429,403	114,476	2,496,256
Kyrgyzstan:	477,942	711,240	562,573	866,165
Tajikistan:	650,012	986,341	986,717	1,582,149
Uzbekistan:	1,074,669	1,453,415	1,452,396	2,048,730
Turkmenistan:	17, 7	686	1,660	25,850

As we can see, Uzbekistan remains the leader in labor migration, followed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The heads of states of Central Asia intend to resolve these problems in a multilateral and positive manner. At the Seventh Consultative Meeting in Tashkent [November 16, 2025] it was decided to pay special attention to increasing mutual trade [the volume of mutual trade reached \$10.7 billion in 2025, and investments grew by 17%], develop a common investment space, jointly implement major infrastructure projects – the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the Trans-Afghan Corridor, theregion’s water resources [the creation of a Regional Competence Center in Water Management].

The idea of developing scientific and cultural exchange was supported. Plans were made to hold an annual International Congress on Spiritual Heritage, establish a Scientific Research Fund, and carry out other activities [21].

### **Conclusions**

1. As a specific system of knowledge [theories, approaches, views], the phenomenon of “Turkism” [“Turkic world”] entered the socio-political life of the Central Asian countries in the region beginning in the 1990s. The era of political freedom in the post-Soviet period became fertile ground for the elites of the Turkic peoples and ethnic groups to offer recipes for “happiness” and “social justice” based on a return to national identity as an “eternal and correct philosophical existence”. By fate, Kazakhstan and its leader, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, found themselves at the forefront of this “revival of the spirit of the times” policy. The accession of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan to the "Turkic peoples" project made it a new geopolitical center in the historical Heartland and, most importantly, a point of attraction for the national interests of the world’s major players.

2. The timing and policy of the entry of the spiritual and value orientations of “Turkism” into the public consciousness of the populations of the “CA-5” states have demonstrated that it [Turkism] has found itself in the grip of an idealization of the past as a new “utopia of justice” and the power of objective reality, which is reflected in economic weakness, poverty, and “remnants of the past” for a certain segment of society. First and foremost, this concerns the protection of women’s rights and human dignity. With the

deterioration of the economic situation in the countries of the region, there has been a retreat to traditional values: national, religious, and cultural. Existing stereotypes of the patriarchal system hinder the implementation of principles of equal opportunity for all members of society and do not allow for an assessment of actual gender resources and opportunities in the realities of a society that has long lived according to the laws of a market-based public consciousness.

3. Since the inception of the “Turkish peace” project, Turkey has claimed and continues to claim the palm of primacy in its formation. This suggests that the path toward Turkey’s return to mainstream politics in a critical region of global players’ interests is based on Ahmet Davutoglu’s concept of “Strategic Depth: Turkish Foreign Policy”. However, as practice shows, “here and now”, Turkey’s ambitions are not accepted by the Central Asian 5 countries themselves and their leaders, nor by Moscow, Washington, Brussels, or Beijing.

#### **References:**

1. Kissinger Henry. *Diplomacy*. Gotsatsyuka, V. Horbatko. K.: Publishing house /KM-BUKS group. 2018. 930 p.
2. Brzezinskiy Z. *The Great Chessboard American Primacy and Its Strategic Imperatives*. Translated by Olena Feshovets Lviv – Ivano-Frankivsk “Aileya-NV”. 2000. 236 p., p. 42.
3. Sartre J.P. *Existentialism is Humanism*. URL: [https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Sartre\\_Jean-Paul/Ekzystentsializm\\_-\\_tse\\_humanizm\\_fr.pdf?PHPSESSID=4rm3ibd2vqcpqc61rl5hvob0n0](https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Sartre_Jean-Paul/Ekzystentsializm_-_tse_humanizm_fr.pdf?PHPSESSID=4rm3ibd2vqcpqc61rl5hvob0n0) [accessed December 2, 2025].
4. Serhiy Shevchenko. *Ontological world of existence in philosophy M. Gaidegera: “DAS SELBST” VERSUS “DAS MAN”*. URL: [https://vlp.com.ua/files/11\\_51.pdf](https://vlp.com.ua/files/11_51.pdf) [accessed December 2, 2025].
5. Melnyk V. *Legal legality of the Turkic Khaganate (552-568): Iranian-Byzantine aspect*. URL: [http://yurvisnyk.in.ua/v4\\_2020/20.pdf](http://yurvisnyk.in.ua/v4_2020/20.pdf). [accessed December 12, 2025].
6. Ishanova D.M. *The birth of the ideology of Turkism*. URL: <https://moluch.ru/archive/304/68486> [accessed December 5, 2025].
7. Topdzhu E. *100 years of the Republic of Turkey: what will happen to Atatürk’s legacy*. URL: <https://www.dw.com/ru/100-let-tureckoj-respublike-cto-stanet-s-naslediem-aturka/a-67234530> [accessed December 3, 2025].
8. Volodimir Grubov, Igor Khraban. *Neo-Ottoman project of the president R.T. Erdogan: geography and power levers of great strategy // Traditional and innovative scientific research: domestic and foreign experience: Scientific monograph*. Riga, Latvia: Baltija Publishing, 2024. 716 p. P. 236-261.

9. The five largest Turkic peoples of Russia. URL: <https://milli-firka> [accessed December 10, 2025].

10. Suleymanova Sevda Yunis gyzy. The origin of the ideology of turkism at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. URL: [https://www.academia.edu/37693014/0%D0%97%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9E%D0%96%D0%94%D0%95%D0%9D%D0%98%D0%95%D0%98%D0%94%D0%95%D0%9E%D0%9B%D0%9E%D0%93%D0%98%D0%98\\_%D0%A2%D0%AE%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%98%D0%97%D0%9C%D0%90\\_%D0%9D%D0%90\\_%D0%A1%D0%A2%D0%AB%D0%9A%D0%95\\_XIX\\_XX\\_%D0%92%D0%92](https://www.academia.edu/37693014/0%D0%97%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9E%D0%96%D0%94%D0%95%D0%9D%D0%98%D0%95%D0%98%D0%94%D0%95%D0%9E%D0%9B%D0%9E%D0%93%D0%98%D0%98_%D0%A2%D0%AE%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%98%D0%97%D0%9C%D0%90_%D0%9D%D0%90_%D0%A1%D0%A2%D0%AB%D0%9A%D0%95_XIX_XX_%D0%92%D0%92) [accessed December 13, 2025].

11. Dimitriady M. Proshchai, Cyrillic: how Turkey rewrote the alphabet in Central Asia. URL: <https://rtvi.com/stories/proshchay-kirillitsa-kak-turtsiya-perepisala-alfavit-v-sredney-azii/> [accessed December 16, 2025].

12. Aron R. Peace and war between nations: Trans. from French. K.: MP “Univers”, 2000. 688 p. ISBN 966-7305-24-4. URL: [https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Aron\\_Raymond/Myr\\_i\\_viina\\_mizh\\_natsiiamy.pdf?PHPSESSID=c4rdqsn3iscofp7177lus6m333](https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Aron_Raymond/Myr_i_viina_mizh_natsiiamy.pdf?PHPSESSID=c4rdqsn3iscofp7177lus6m333) [accessed December 3, 2025].

13. Rakhimullina G.Z. The Turkic factor in the process of integration of Central Asian countries. URL: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366617347> [accessed December 17, 2025].

14. Rashidova D. Uzbekistan: protection of women and opportunities for them. URL: <https://www.uzbekistan.org.ua/ru/news/6860-uzbekistan-zashita-jenshin-i.html> [accessed December 19, 2025].

15. Media zone “There is a percentage of men who are afraid that women will have a choice”. What hinders gender equality in Uzbekistan. URL: <https://mediazona.ca/article/2025/01/30/uz-women-rights> [accessed December 19, 2025].

16. Zharkynbaeva R.S. Gender aspects of social policy in Central Asia in the context of urbanization processes. URL: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348225599> [accessed December 21, 2025].

17. Shkapsky O. The position of women among the nomads of Central Asia. Central Asian Bulletin. Tashkent. 1896. 6-7. URL: [https://www.academia.edu/82\\_1896\\_6\\_7](https://www.academia.edu/82_1896_6_7) [accessed December 21, 2025].

18. Thorez Julien. Brain Drain in the Context of Diversifying Central Asian Migration Flows. URL: <https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03897977/document> [accessed December 23, 2025].

19. Kazakhstan is the most Russian-speaking country in Central Asia. URL: <https://e-cis.info/news/566/132305/> [accessed December 23, 2025].

20. Novikova. N. Yu. Statistical accounting of labor migration in the CIS region. CIS Statistical Committee. Group of Experts on Migration Statistics. Geneva. Switzerland. May 7-8, 2024. URL: [https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/6\\_GoE\\_Migration\\_WP8\\_CIS\\_Novikova\\_RUS.pdf](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/6_GoE_Migration_WP8_CIS_Novikova_RUS.pdf) [accessed December 24, 2025].

21. Azerbaijan joined the format of the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia. URL: <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2025/11/16/central-asia-azerbajjan/> [accessed December 26, 2025].