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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE CONFLICTS ON UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC STABILITY: A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

International trade has entered a phase in which restrictive measures are applied routinely rather than exceptionally, while the multilateral procedures meant to contain them have lost authority. Ukraine's position in this environment is specific: the Ukrainian economy is characterized by a high degree of trade openness, yet the country is rarely a direct addressee of such measures, so their impact reaches it indirectly – through world market conditions, demand in partner economies and the reconfiguration of value chains. Systems that monitor restrictive measures record them by the imposing jurisdiction and the partners directly affected, leaving such economies outside the accounting, while methodologies of macroeconomic stability do not distinguish the sources of external pressure. The Ukrainian case falls into the gap between these two planes, and wartime conditions deepen it. This paper substantiates a methodological framework for assessing that impact on Ukraine's economic stability. A trade conflict is treated here as the generic concept – the deliberate use of trade policy instruments by a state to obtain advantage or exert pressure – and a trade war as its escalation phase, distinguished by the scale and reciprocity of the measures rather than by their nature. N. Kalyuzhna [1] treats interstate trade conflicts as the embodiment of neo-protectionism and warns against equating tensions of differing severity with trade war, which implies that intensity is a graded characteristic; her later work outlines deglobalization scenarios of the world economy [2]. N. Kalyuzhna and O. Stepichieva [3] place the intensification of trade conflicts among the drivers of neo-protectionism,

and V. Panchenko and N. Reznikova [4] trace the shift from tariff protection to a complex state mechanism of competitiveness, which explains why much of contemporary confrontation proceeds in latent forms. A. Mazaraki and T. Melnyk [5] differentiate the instruments of trade wars into offensive and defensive; T. Hordieieva [6] examines trade disputes within the regulatory paradigm, which allows the legal status of a measure to be treated as an independent characteristic; the study edited by V. Yurchyshyn [7] addresses the effects of contemporary trade wars on Ukraine. H. Pylypenko and I. Huzenko [8] substantiate an interdisciplinary approach to global economic processes, and O. Liulov, V. Bozhenko and A. Zolkover [9] show that the conventional set of stability indicators is of limited informative value, part of it not being computable for Ukraine. The two planes thus remain unconnected – the gap addressed here.

Assessment presupposes that the conflict itself is structured rather than treated as a black box. Four parameters are proposed. Intensity is measured by the number and coverage of restrictive measures per unit of time, the share of bilateral turnover they cover and the symmetry of countermeasures; following [1] it is continuous rather than binary, and it is not identical to damage, since a high-intensity conflict between third parties may affect Ukraine less than moderate restrictions touching its key export positions. Scale requires two dimensions – the proper scale of the confrontation and the scale relevant for Ukraine: the parties' share in its foreign trade, the weight of the affected commodity groups in its exports and imports, and the participation of domestic producers in value chains passing through those economies. For a non-party economy the second is decisive. Duration shapes the reaction of economic agents: short-lived restrictions cause cyclical shifts, whereas protracted confrontation triggers structural adjustment, the costliest and least reversible; expectations of continuation matter no less than the realized period, since a political configuration that keeps protectionist decisions advantageous for a government sustains them [10]. Instrument composition determines the channels: tariffs act through prices, non-tariff measures through volumes and the cost of market access, often with a higher restrictive effect in a less conspicuous form [4], financial and sanction instruments through settlements and investment, export control through access to critical components. The legal status of each measure is recorded alongside its type [6].

Applied to Ukraine, these instruments resolve into three channels. The trade channel carries the most direct effect, and the vulnerability here is

structural: exports are dominated by goods of low processing depth, whose markets are highly sensitive to price movements and restrictions, so that the terms of market access and the cost of logistics acquire macroeconomic significance; measures that do not concern Ukraine at all still redirect the exports of the parties towards the markets on which its producers compete. The financial channel operates through the cost of external borrowing, the foreign exchange market and investment flows. The technological channel defines the long-term perspective, since dependence on imported equipment makes global technological rivalry a constraint on reconstruction and modernization. The channels act cumulatively and are superimposed on shocks of non-trade origin, so their delimitation is analytical rather than strictly quantitative.

Economic stability has no direct statistical expression. Reducing indicators to a composite index conceals the composition of the observed shift, and part of the required indicators is not computable for Ukraine [9]; a system structured by channels and levels is therefore preferable. The first level records the manifestation of impact by channel: volumes, commodity structure and geographical concentration of trade, indices of average export and import prices and the terms of trade; the current account balance, foreign direct investment, the cost of external borrowing and international reserves; imports of high-technology and investment goods and dependence on critical components. The second level covers the aggregate state of the economy – real GDP, industrial output, fixed capital investment, price indices and the exchange rate. The third covers structural vulnerability – the share of individual markets in exports, dependence on imports of critical commodity groups and participation in value chains – which measures not the realized effect but sensitivity to future shocks and grounds preventive policy. It relies on data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and the National Bank of Ukraine, which keeps it operable under wartime limitations.

The components are combined into five stages: identification of the conflict and measurement of its four parameters; determination of the channels from the instrument composition; selection of first-level indicators for those channels together with the assessment of third-level vulnerability; quantitative estimation by economic-statistical and correlation-regression analysis of the relationship between indicators of external conditions and Ukrainian economic dynamics, with account of time lags and control for non-trade factors; interpretation of the results and substantiation of response measures differentiated by channel – diversification of export markets, strengthening of financial resilience,

reduction of technological dependence. Its limitations follow from the empirical base: monitoring is retrospective, the channels act cumulatively, and short wartime samples lower the power of statistical tests.

Assessing the impact of global trade conflicts on Ukraine's economic stability cannot be reduced to a single indicator or method: it requires describing the conflict through measurable parameters, identifying the channels of transmission and constructing an indicator system for the affected economy. The distinction between the proper scale of a conflict and its scale relevant for the national economy is decisive for a country that is not a party to it. The impact reaches Ukraine through the trade, financial and technological channels acting cumulatively, with the first dominant and the third determining the long-term perspective. Structuring indicators by channels and levels is preferable to aggregation into a composite index, since it identifies the path of transmission and separates the realized effect from sensitivity to future shocks. The five-stage procedure links the conflict's parameters with the indicators of stability, allowing the move from stating consequences to substantiating response measures by channel. Further research is directed towards the empirical verification of the framework on the data of the Ukrainian economy.

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