FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE ECTHR DECISION EXECUTION SYSTEM: BRITISH EXPERIENCE FOR UKRAINE

Abstract

The subject of the study is the financial architecture of executing judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a component of the rule-of-law system and fiscal governance. The paper examines how budget planning, payment procedures, institutional responsibility, and the financing of general measures interact in ensuring timely payment of just satisfaction and effective prevention of repetitive violations. Special attention is paid to the comparative value of the United Kingdom’s execution model for Ukraine, given Ukraine’s centralised payment track, treasury constraints, and wartime fiscal pressure. Methodology. The research is based on a combination of comparative-legal, systemic, and institutional approaches. It integrates analysis of Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers’ supervision framework with an assessment of the UK’s domestic execution and accountability arrangements (government reporting, parliamentary scrutiny, and public finance management rules) and Ukraine’s statutory execution model and budget-program architecture. This methodological design enables the identification of institutional and financial “break points” that affect payment timeliness and the capacity of general measures execution. The aim of the work is to substantiate the concept of financial architecture for the execution of ECtHR judgments and to define realistic directions for improving the Ukrainian model based on the UK experience, taking into account Ukraine’s budget system, treasury procedures, and institutional capacity. The results of the study show that execution of ECtHR judgments should be treated not only as a legal obligation but also as a fiscal-management cycle that links (1) predictable budgeting and forecasting, (2) operational payment capacity, (3) accountability and reporting, and (4) stable financing of general measures as the main tool for reducing repetitiveness. The UK model tends toward departmental ownership of execution combined with central coordination and parliamentary scrutiny, which strengthens incentives to internalise the cost of non-compliance and to embed general measures into sectoral spending programs. By contrast, Ukraine’s centralised payment mechanism ensures solvency but weakens the linkage between the violating authority and fiscal consequences, while general measures are often fragmented across sector budgets without a unified planning-and-financing track. The paper proposes a prevention-capable reform package for Ukraine based on a mixed architecture: a consolidated budget framework for payments (program or fund) complemented by mandatory co-financing rules for general measures within the budgets of responsible authorities; a treasury timeline standard (SLA) for payments; regular parliamentary reporting and performance audit; a digital execution register aligned with the supervision cycle; and KPI-based management focused on payment timeliness, closure rates, repetitiveness dynamics, and the measurable cost of non-compliance. Conclusion. A sustainable execution system requires shifting from a predominantly payment-centred approach toward an integrated financial architecture that finances prevention through general measures and aligns money, responsibility, and supervision in one accountable cycle. For Ukraine, the most feasible path is not copying UK institutional forms but reproducing their functional logic: guaranteed payment capacity combined with budget-backed responsibility for structural remedies, strengthened oversight, and performance-oriented transparency that reduces repetitive violations and long-term fiscal risk.