Yuliia Shapoval


The object of the article is central bank communication design (particularly target audience, channels and instruments) and central banks’ transparency measurement. The purpose is to summarise the central bank communication policy's conceptual basics and clarify how transparent the NBU’s monetary policy is. Methodology. The paper applies the Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) and Al-Mashat et al. (2018) methods of transparency measurement, using the NBU’s published documents and website data as of 2021. Results. It has been emphasized that communication design should be based on central bank’s communication objectives, information demand from defined stakeholders and target groups, capabilities of application of channels and instruments. Ensuring confidence in monetary policy calls for simplified language and format that reflects the general public's interest. The shift to the growing role of the type of communication channel and interaction of central bank with the general public are marked out. The meaning of transparency, criteria, and indices (Eijffinger-Geraats, Dincer-Eichengreen, Crowe-Meade, Cournede-Minegishi, CBT-IT index) are under consideration. According to Dincer and Eichengreen, the NBU’s transparency index reaches almost a perfect score of 12 (out of 15), affirming NBU’s political and policy transparency improvements. The NBU’s CBT-IT transparency index scores 11.45 (out of 20), which points to the need to eliminate gaps of the FPAS designed to support full-fledged inflation- forecast-targeting (3.2 out of 9) in the light of improvements in the monetary policymaking process (5.75 out of 7) and transparency about monetary policy objectives (2.5 out of 3). Practical implications. The enhancement of the NBU’s transparency level reflects the development of its communication policy as transparency of monetary policy requires constant and coherent messages via diversified channels and instruments for a defined target audience, following a clear purpose of strategic communication. Value/originality. It has been highlighted that central bank communication design is the basis for financial market participants' trust, favouring monetary policy transparency.

How to Cite

Shapoval, Y. (2021). CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION DESIGN: TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY OF MONETARY POLICY . Economics & Education, 6(2), 63-68. https://doi.org/10.30525/2500-946X/2021-2-11
Article views: 56 | PDF Downloads: 35



central bank, monetary policy, communication, transparency index, expectation, trust, the National Bank of Ukraine


Adolfson, M., Laséen, S., Christiano, L., Trabandt, M., & Walentin, K. (2013). Ramses II – Model Description. Sveriges Riksbank occasional paper series, 12.

Ahokpossi, C., Isnawangsih, A., Naoaj, Md. S., & Yan, T. (2020). The Impact of Monetary Policy Communication in an Emerging Economy: The Case of Indonesia. IMF Working Paper, 109.

Al-Mashat, R. A., Bulir, M. A., Dinçer, N. N., Hlédik, T., Holub, M. T., Kostanyan, A., Laxton, D., Nurbekyan, A., Portillo, R. & Wang, H. (2018). An index for transparency for inflation-targeting central banks: application to the Czech National Bank. IMF Working papers, 18/210.

Anufriieva, K., & Shapoval, Y. (2019). Verbal interventions of the National Bank of Ukraine: The impact of exchange rate. Journal of International Studies, 12(3), 92108. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2019/12-3/8

Baranowski, P., Doryń, W., Łyziak, T., & Stanisławska, E. (2020). Words versus deeds: How central banks manage expectations. VoxEU. E-source: https://voxeu.org/article/words-versus-deeds-how-central-banks-manage-expectations

Crowe, C. & Meade, E. E. (2008). Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness. IMF Working Papers, 119.

Dincer, N. N., & Eichengreen, B. (2014). Central bank transparency and independence: updates and new measures. International Journal of Central Banking, 10 (1), 189‒253.

Dincer, N. N., & Eichengreen, B. (2014). Central bank transparency and independence: updates and new measures. International Journal of Central Banking, 10 (1), 189‒253.

Dincer, N., & Eichengreen, B. (2007). Central bank transparency: where, why, and with what effects? NBER Working Paper, 13003.

Eijffinger, S. C., & Geraats, P. M. (2006). How transparent are central banks? European Journal of Political Economy, 22(1), 1‒21.

Fry, M., D. Julius, L. Mahadeva, S. Roger, & Sternen, G. (2000). Key issues in the choice of monetary policy framework. Monetary policy frameworks in a global context, 1, 1–216.

Geraats, P. M. (2002). Central bank transparency. The economic journal, 112 (483), 532‒565. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00082

Haldane, A., Macaulay, A., & McMahon, M. (2020). The 3 E’s of central bank communication with the public. Bank of England Staff Working Paper, 847.

Huang, J., & Simon, J. (2021). Central bank communication: one size does not fit all. RBA Research Discussion Papers, RDP 2021-05.

Macklem, T. (2020). The imperative for public engagement. Central bank speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.

Minegishi, M. & Cournède, B. (2009). The role of transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 724. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1787/221128317344

MPhil, Cdr SA Tatham (2008). Strategic Communication: A Primer. Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the UK.

Razumkov centre (2021). Trust in the institutions of society and politicians, electoral orientations of the citizens of Ukraine (July-August 2021). E-source: https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/dovira-do-nstytutiv-suspilstva-ta-politykiv-elektoralni-oriientatsii-gromadian-ukrainy

Ter Ellen, S., Larsen, V. H., & Thorsrud, L. A. (2020). Narrative monetary policy surprises and the media: How central banks reach the general public. VoxEU. E-source: https://voxeu.org/article/narrative-monetary-policy-surprises-and-media

ECB (2021). Transparency. E-source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html

Unsal, D. F., & Garbers, H. (2021). Central Bank Communication Through COVID-19. IMF Special Series on COVID-19.